

Christoph Lumer

Extended Curriculum Vitae

(Last update: 6 December 2019)

Summary

Christoph Lumer is a Full Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Siena (Italy). Before he has been Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Siena and Associate as well as Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Osnabrück (Germany). He has been a visiting scholar for extended periods at the Universities of Urbino (Italy), Ann Arbor (Michigan), Siena (Italy) and Toronto (Canada). He has a Ph.D. in Philosophy and a Master in Sociology from the University of Münster (Germany).

His fields of research include:

ethics (normative ethics, metaethics and some applied ethics, in particular climate ethics, environmental ethics, future ethics, bioethics, political ethics, economic ethics);

theory of practical rationality: utility / desirability theory, theories of the good life, rational decision and game theory;

philosophical anthropology: philosophy of action, moral psychology, theory of emotion, happiness and well-being;

theory of argumentation;

metaphilosophy.

In these fields he has *published* 3 monographic books, over 100 articles and edited 8 books or special issues of scientific journals.

In the field of *practical rationality theory* he has developed a critical theory of prudential desirability and a general criterion of rational decision.

In *ethics* he has developed an internalist conception of justifying morals and on this basis a (quantitatively elaborated) prioritarian criterion of moral value and distributive justice as well as a new criterion of moral duties: progressive norm welfarism. Furthermore, he has applied these criteria pre-eminently for evaluating options with respect to climate change, but also in other fields like future ethics, ethics of economics, ethics of democracy.

In *argumentation theory* he has elaborated an epistemological approach with most of the necessary ramifications: definition and criterion of 'good argument', justification of the approach, criteria of various types of argument, system and classification of argument schemes, fallacy theory, argument interpretation etc.

1. Present Position and Contact

Christoph Lumer is full professor of Moral Philosophy (professore ordinario di filosofia morale, SSD: M-Fil/03) at the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences (DISPOC) of the University of Siena:

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1. <http://www.lumer.info/>

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3. <https://docenti.unisi.it/en/lumer>

2. Formation and Career

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|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 24.2.1956 | Born in Ratingen (near Düsseldorf), Germany; German citizenship. |
| 10.1974-12.80 | Studies of sociology, philosophy and history at the universities of Münster (Germany) and Bologna (Italy); |
| 15.12.1980 | Master's degree ("Magister Artium") in sociology with a master's thesis on "Political ecology" and philosophy and ancient history as minor subjects from the University of Münster. |
| 1.1981-4.1982 | Alternative service in a social institution for elder and handicapped people (Mobiler Sozialer Hilfsdienst in Münster). |
| 5.1982-7.1986 | Graduate studies in philosophy and sociology at the universities of Münster (Germany) and Berlin (Freie Universität, Germany) and preparation of a dissertation. |
| 10.1985-6.1986 | Scientific assistant at the institute of philosophy at the University of Münster; working field: tutoring of courses in formal logic. |
| 14.7.1986 | Ph. D. ("Doktor der Philosophie") in philosophy from the University of Münster with a dissertation "Practical Theory of Argumentation - |

- Theoretical Foundations, Practical Justification and Rules of Some Important Types of Argument" ("Praktische Argumentationstheorie - Theoretische Grundlagen, praktische Begründung und Regeln wichtiger Argumentationsarten") and sociology and ancient history as minor subjects; grade: summa cum laude.
- 10.1986-2.1987 Teaching classes in philosophy at the University of Oldenburg (Germany); subjects: philosophy of language, philosophy of science.
- 1.1987-4.1993 Assistant professor ("Hochschulassistent") of philosophy at the University of Osnabrück (Germany).
- 3.-6.1990 Visiting professor at the University of Urbino (Italy).
- 11.2.1993 Habilitation ("Habilitation") for philosophy at the University of Osnabrück with a habilitation thesis "Rational Altruism - A Prudentialist Theory of Rationality and Altruism" ("Rationaler Altruismus - Eine prudentielle Theorie der Rationalität und des Altruismus").
- 10.1993-10.1999 Associate professor ("Hochschuldozent") of philosophy at the University of Osnabrück.
- 9.-12.1994 Visiting Scholar at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor (USA).
- 26.4.1995 Nomination as an extra-budgetary professor ("Außerplanmäßiger Professor") at the University of Osnabrück.
- 11.1999-3.2002 Contract professor ("Professore a contratto") at the University of Siena (Italy) and, alternating, leading researcher in the research project "How good is life?", financed by the German National Research Council (DFG) at the University of Osnabrück.
- 4.2002-10.2016 Associate professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Siena.
- 27.1.2014 Italian national habilitation for a full professorship in moral philosophy (abilitazione alla I fascia di insegnamento di Filosofia Morale)
- 9.2014 Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto.
- 1988-2016 Short-term teaching sojourns at the universities of Urbino, Siena, Bremen, Oldenburg, Dublin (University College), Osnabrück, Saarbrücken.
- Since 11.2016 Full professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Siena.

I am married with Dr. med. Eleonore Lumer. We have two children.

Languages: I can teach in German, English and Italian. I can read French, Spanish and Latin.

3. Publications (last update 6 December 2019)

For an extensive and more closely updated list of my publications please visit my website:

http://www.lumer.info/?page_id=19

For downloading publications please use:

http://www.lumer.info/?page_id=65

3.1. (Monographic) Books

B1—Practical Theory of Argumentation. Theoretical Foundations, Practical Justification and Rules of Some Important Types of Arguments. ("Praktische Argumentationstheorie. Theoretische Grundlagen, praktische Begründung und Regeln wichtiger Argumentationsarten", in German). Braunschweig: Vieweg 1990. XI, 474 pp.

B2—Rational Altruism. A Prudential Theory of Rationality and Altruism. ("Rationaler Altruismus. Eine prudenzielle Theorie der Rationalität und des Altruismus", in German.)

1. *1st ed.*: Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch 2000. 652 pp.

2. 2nd, supplemented ed. Paderborn: mentis ²2009. 675 pp.

B3—The Greenhouse. A Welfare Assessment and Some Morals. Lanham, Md.; New York; Oxford: University Press of America 2002. ix; 117 pp.

B4—Cognitive Philosophy of Action. Empirical Laws of Action, Freedom and the Foundations of Practical Rationality. ("Kognitive Handlungstheorie. Empirische Handlungsgesetze, Freiheit und die Grundlagen praktischer Rationalität", in German). (In preparation.)

3.2. Editions

E1—(With Sandro Nannini:) Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy - The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate 2007. xiii; 311 pp. - Contributions by: Frederick Adams & Annie Steadman, Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Carl Ginet, Geert Keil, Christoph Lumer, Hugh McCann, Alfred Mele, Carlos Moya, Sandro Nannini, Michael Quante, Neil Roughley, Gottfried Seebass, Thomas Spitzley, Ralf Stoecker.

E2—The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation. = Two special issues of: *Informal Logic* 25,3 (2005), pp. 189-287; 26,1 (2006), pp. 1-120. - Contributions by: Mark Battersby, John Biro & Harvey Siegel, Richard Feldman, James B. Freeman, Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford, Michael Hoffmann, Brian Huss, Christoph Lumer, Mark Weinstein, Michael Weinstock.

E3—Normative Ethics - Principles of Acting Morally. ("Etica normativa - principi dell'agire morale", in Italian.) Roma: Carocci 2008. 191 pp. - With contributions by: Francesco Allegri,

Luisella Battaglia, Sergio Cremaschi, Vanna Gessa-Kurotschka, Christoph Lumer, Sebastiano Maffettone, Maria Moneti, Furio Semerari, Stefano Semplici, Isabel Trujillo Pérez.

E4—Rational Choice and Ethics. = Special issue of: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13,5 (2010). Pp. 483-593. - With contributions by: Sven Ove Hansson, Christoph Lumer, Edward McClennen, Jan Narveson, Bruno Verbeek.

E5—(With Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels:) Meaningful and Violent Actions. Philosophical Essays for Georg Meggle. ("Handeln mit Bedeutung und Handeln mit Gewalt. Philosophische Aufsätze für Georg Meggle", the contributions are in German or English.) Paderborn: mentis 2009. 478 pp. - With contributions by: Christoph Fehige, Günther Grewendorf, Ted Honderich, Beatrice Kobow, Nikola Kompa, Weyma Lübke, Christoph Lumer, Georg Meggle, Daniel Messelken, Igor Primoratz, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Richard Raatzsch, Peter Rohs, Oliver R. Scholz, Rudolf Schüssler, Peter Singer, Wolfgang Spohn, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Raimo Tuomela, Ulla Wessels, Véronique Zanetti.

E6—(With Uwe Meyer:) Mind and Morals. Analytical Reflections for Wolfgang Lenzen. ("Geist und Moral. Analytische Reflexionen für Wolfgang Lenzen", most contributions are in German, some are in English.) Paderborn: mentis 2011. 310 pp. - With contributions by: Ansgar Beckermann, Dieter Birnbacher, Antonella Corradini, Christoph Fehige, Andreas Kamlah, Franz von Kutschera, Christoph Lumer, Georg Meggle, Saskia K. Nagel, Uwe Meyer, Arnim Regenbogen, Jan Slaby, Achim Stephan, Rainer Trapp and Sven Walter.

E7—Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. Boston; Berlin: de Gruyter 2014. 5^o; 212 pp. - With contributions by: Arnaldo Benini, Antonella Corradini, Christoph Lumer, Michael Pauen, Massimo Reichlin and Maureen Sie.

E8—(With Giacomo Romano:) From Philosophy of Action to Philosophy of Mind – Reflections in Honour of Sandro Nannini. ("Dalla filosofia dell'azione alla filosofia della mente – Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini", in Italian.) Messina: corisco 2018. 235 pp. – With contributions by: Mario De Caro, Sara Dellantonio, Rosaria Egidi, Roberta Lanfredini, Christoph Lumer, Sandro Nannini, Paolo Parrini, Pietro Perconti, Claudio Pizzi, Emanuela Scribano, Giuseppe Varnier. – Open access: <<http://www.coriscoedizioni.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/dalla-filosofia-dellazione-alla-filosofia-della-mente.pdf>>.

3.3. Articles

A1—The Disputation. A Special Type of Cooperative Argumentative Dialogue. In: Argumentation 2 (1988). Pp. 441-464.

A2—Aims and Methods of Philosophy. ("Ziele und Methoden der Philosophie", in German.) In: Aufgaben der Philosophie heute. Arbeitstagung des Fachbereichs Kultur- und Geowissenschaften

(Universität Osnabrück) in Verbindung mit dem Istituto di Filosofia (Università degli Studi di Urbino), 24. - 26. Oktober 1988. Osnabrück: Osnabrücker Philosophische Schriften [1989]. Pp. 108-132.

A3—Argument, Theory of Argumentation. ("Argumentation, Argumentationstheorie", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 246-255.

A4—Justification. ("Begründung", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 364-369.

A5—The Contribution of Philosophy to the Improvement of Argumentation: the Development of Criteria for Valid Arguments. ("Der philosophische Beitrag zur Verbesserung des Argumentierens: die Entwicklung von Gültigkeitskriterien für Argumentationen", in German.) In: Harm Paschen; Lothar Wigger (ed.): Über die Bedingungen der Verbesserung des Argumentierens. Dokumentation der Tagung: "Bedingungen der Verbesserung des Argumentierens" vom 27 und 28. April 1989 im Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF) der Universität Bielefeld. Bielefeld 1990. Pp. 59-74.

A6—Confirmation. ("Bestätigung", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 373-378.

A7—Discourse and Argumentation Theory of Truth and Rationality? ("Diskurs- und Argumentationstheorie der Wahrheit und Rationalität?", in German.) In: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften. 1 (1990). Pp. 363-365.

A8—Validity. ("Geltung - Gültigkeit", in German.)

1. *First version*: In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 258-262.

2. *Revised version in*: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 450-455.

3. *Strongly revised and enlarged version in*: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 811-818.

A9—Action. ("Handlung", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 499-511.

A10—Theories of Action. ("Handlungstheorien", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 511-514.

A11—Induction. ("Induktion", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische

Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 659-676.

A12—Cognitivism - Noncognitivism. ("Kognitivismus - Nonkognitivismus", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 821-824.

A13—Normative - Descriptive - Actual. ("Normativ - deskriptiv - faktisch", in German.)

1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 3. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 588-592.

2. *Completely revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 957-961.

3. *Enlarged and further revised version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 1805-1809.

A14—Sentence, Statement. ("Satz, Aussage", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Europäische Enzyklopädie zu Philosophie und Wissenschaften. Vol. 4. Hamburg: Meiner 1990. Pp. 177-188.

A15—Argumentative Dialogues. A Philosophical Reconstruction of Disputation. ("Argumentative Dialoge. Eine philosophische Rekonstruktion von Disputationen", in German.) In: Sorin Stati; Edda Weigand; Franz Hundsnurscher (ed.): Dialoganalyse III. Referate der 3. Arbeitstagung Bologna 1990. Teil 1. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1991. Pp. 353-367.

A16—Structure and Function of Argumentations. An Epistemological Approach to Determining Criteria for the Validity and Adequacy of Argumentations. In: Frans H. van Eemeren [et al.] (eds.): Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Argumentation. Organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) at the University of Amsterdam, June 19-22, 1990. Amsterdam: Sicsat 1991. Pp. 98-107.

A17—Action Explaining Interpretation as a Means for Analyzing Semantical Meaning. ("Handlungstheoretisch erklärende Interpretationen als Mittel der semantischen Bedeutungsanalyse", in German.) In: Lutz Danneberg; Friedrich Vollhardt (eds.): Vom Umgang mit Literatur und Literaturgeschichte. Positionen und Perspektiven nach der "Theoriedebatte". Stuttgart: Metzler 1992. Pp. 75-113.

A18—The Gap between Judgment and Action and the Meaning of "x is Good for Person y". ("Die Lücke zwischen Urteil und Handeln und die Bedeutung von "x ist gut für die Person y"", in German.) In: Christoph Fehige; Georg Meggle (eds.): Zum moralischen Denken. Vol. 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1995. Pp. 254-281.

A19—The Theoretical Approach of the Practical Theory of Argumentation. ("Der theoretische Ansatz der Praktischen Argumentationstheorie", in German.) In: Harald Wohlrapp (ed.): Wege

der Argumentationsforschung. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog 1995. Pp. 81-101.

A20—What is a Sound Justification of Morals? ("Was ist eine triftige Moralbegründung?", in German.) In: Georg Meggle; Ulla Wessels (eds.): *Analyomen 1. Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy"*. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter 1994. Pp. 785-796.

A21—Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? In: Christoph Fehige; Ulla Wessels (eds.): *Preferences*. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter 1998. Pp. 33-56.

A22—Ethics Aggregating Desirability Instead of Ethics of the Weighting Reason. ("Wünschbarkeitsaggregationsethik statt Ethik der abwägenden Vernunft", in German). In: *Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften* 4 (1993). Pp. 618-620.

A23—Habermas' Discourse Ethics. ("Habermas' Diskursethik", in German.) In: *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 51 (1997). Pp. 42-64.

A24—Propositions. ("Propositionen", in German.) In: Wolfgang Lenzen (ed.): *Tractatus physico-philosophici*. Festschrift für Andreas Kamlah. Osnabrück: Osnabrücker philosophische Schriften 1993. Pp. 115-144.

A25—Motivation for Moral Action and Discourse Ethics. ("Motivation zu moralischem Handeln und Diskursethik", in German.) In: Jean-Paul Harpes; Wolfgang Kuhlmann (eds.): *Zur Relevanz der Diskursethik. Anwendungsprobleme der Diskursethik in Wirtschaft und Politik. Dokumentation des Kolloquiums in Luxemburg (10.-12. Dezember 1993)*. Münster: Lit 1997. Pp. 5-22.

A26—Rules and Moral Norms in Sports. In: *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 30 (1995). Pp. 263-281.

A27—Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses.

1. *Revised and improved version in: Argumentation* 11 (1997). Pp. 329-340.

2. *Original version in: Frans H. van Eemeren [et al.] (eds.): Analysis and Evaluation. Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21-24, 1994). Vol. II. Amsterdam: Sic Sat 1995. Pp. 91-101.*

A28—Implicatures - General Theory and Applications in the Theory of Argumentation. ("Implikaturen - Allgemeine Theorie und argumentationstheoretische Anwendung", in German.) In: Frank Liedtke (ed.): *Implikaturen. Grammatische und pragmatische Analysen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1995. Pp. 165-186.

A29—Inferences from Is to Ought and Other Types of Justifying Morals. ("Sein-Sollen-Schlüsse und andere Typen der Moralbegründung", in German.) In: *Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften* 6

(1995). Pp. 203-206.

A30—Cognitive Theory of Action - the Methodological Approach. ("Kognitive Handlungstheorie - der methodische Ansatz", in German.) In: Georg Meggle (ed.): *Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy"*. Vol. III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter. 1997. Pp. 263-270.

A31—Hedonism Corrected for the Valuing Personality. ("Persönlichkeitstheoretisch korrigierter Hedonismus", in German.) In: Christoph Hubig; Hans Poser (eds.): *Cognitio humana - Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte. XVII. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie Leipzig 1996. Workshop-Beiträge vol. 1*. Berlin: ProduServ 1996. Pp. 132-139.

A32—Utilex - Distributive Justice Based on Sympathy. ("Utilex - Verteilungsgerechtigkeit auf Empathiebasis", in German.) In: Peter Koller; Klaus Puhl (eds.): *Current Issues in Political Philosophy. Justice in Society and World Order*. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1997. Pp. 99-110.

A33—Theory of Argumentation and Logic. ("Argumentationstheorie und Logik", in German.) In: Geert-Lueke Lueken (ed.): *Formen der Argumentation*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag 2000. Pp. 53-71.

A34—Who or what Counts in Ecological Ethics? ("Wer oder was zählt in der ökologischen Ethik?", in German.) In: Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.): *Rationalität, Realismus, Revision. Vorträge des 3. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie vom 15. bis zum 18. September 1997 in München*. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter 1999. Pp. 633-639.

A35—The Content of Originally Intrinsic Desires and of Intrinsic Motivation. In: *Acta analytica* 18 (1997). Pp. 107-121.

A36—Höffe's Theory of Political Justice. ("Höffes Theorie politischer Gerechtigkeit", in German.) In: Helen Bohse; Sven Walter (eds.): *Selected Contributions to GAP.6, Sixth International Conference of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Berlin, 11-14 September 2006*. (CD-ROM.) Paderborn: Mentis 2008. Pp. 741-763.

A37—Argument, Theory of Argumentation. ("Argument, Argumentationstheorie", in German.)
1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): *Enzyklopädie Philosophie*. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 88-95.
2. *Revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): *Enzyklopädie Philosophie*. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 151-158.

A38—Justification. ("Begründung", in German.)
1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): *Enzyklopädie Philosophie*. Vol. 1. Hamburg:

Meiner 1999. Pp. 149-156.

2. *Revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 255-262.

A39—The Greenhouse Effect - Moral Evaluation and Moral Duties. ("Der Treibhauseffekt - moralische Bewertung und moralische Pflichten", in German.) In: Peter Kampits; Karoly Kokai; Anja Weiberg (eds.): Angewandte Ethik. Beiträge des 21. Wittgenstein Symposiums. 16.-22. August 1998, Kirchberg am Wechsel. Vol. 2. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 1998. Pp. 41-48.

A40—Intergenerational Justice. A Challenge to Ethical Universalism and Moral Motivation. ("Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit. Eine Herausforderung für den ethischen Universalismus und die moralische Motivation", in German.) In: Reinhold Mokrosch; Arnim Regenbogen (eds.): Was heißt Gerechtigkeit? Ethische Perspektiven zu Erziehung, Politik und Religion. Donauwörth: Auer 1999. Pp. 82-95.

A41—Sources of Morals - A Plea for a Prudential Altruism. ("Quellen der Moral - Plädoyer für einen prudentiellen Altruismus", in German.) In: Conceptus 32 (1999). Pp. 185-216.

A42—Reductionism in Fallacy Theory.

1. *Full version in:* Argumentation 14 (2000). Pp. 405-423.

2. *Abridged version in:* Frans H. van Eemeren; Rob Grootendorst; J. Anthony Blair; Charles A. Willard (eds.): Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: SIC SAT 1999. Pp. 537-542.

A43—Statement, Sentence. ("Aussage, Satz", in German). In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 104-109.

A44—Assertion. ("Behauptung", in German.)

1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 156-159.

2. *Revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 262-266.

A45—Proposition. ("Proposition", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 2. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 1320-1323.

A46—Cognitivism / Noncognitivism. ("Kognitivismus / Nonkognitivismus", in German.)

1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 695-699.

2. *Revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 1246-1251.

A47—Induction. ("Induktion", in German.)

1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 629-636.

2. *Revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 1097-1105.

A48—Action / Theories of Action. ("Handlung / Handlungstheorien", in German.)

1. *First version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 534-547.

2. *Strongly revised and updated version in:* Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. [2nd, revised and enlarged ed.] Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 2010. Pp. 967-980.

A49—Justice. ("Gerechtigkeit", in German.) In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (ed.): Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Meiner 1999. Pp. 464-470.

A50—Motives for Moral Action. ("Motive zu moralischem Handeln", in German.) In: Analyse & Kritik 24 (2002). Pp. 163-188.

A51—Integrative Ethics of Economics Does Better without Discourse Ethics. ("Integrative Wirtschaftsethik besser ohne Diskursethik", in German.) In: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften 11 (2000). Pp. 598-601.

A52—Greenhouse Effect and Responsibility for the Future. ("Treibhauseffekt und Zukunftsverantwortung", in German.) In: Dieter Birnbacher; Gerd Brudermüller (eds.): Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann 2001. Pp. 185-225.

A53—Preferences. ("Präferenzen", in German.) In: Marcus Düwell; Christoph Hüenthal; Micha H. Werner (eds.): Handbuch Ethik. Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler 2002. Pp. 453-457. 2nd, updated and enlarged edition 2006. Pp. 470-474.

A54—Libet's Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision. In: Christoph Lumer (ed.): Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. Boston; Berlin: de Gruyter 2014. Pp. 63-103.

A55—Kantian Externalism and Motives for Moral Action. ("Kantischer Externalismus und Motive zu moralischem Handeln", in German.)

1. *Full version in:* Conceptus 35 (2002/03). Pp. 263-286.

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4. Christoph Lumer's Lines of Research

(State of December 2019)

With respect to contents, some of the main philosophical questions I am primarily interested in are:

- moral criteria in general and criteria of justice in particular, as well as the application of these criteria to social, political and economical systems;
- happiness, criteria of the good and of prudential rationality, the good life;

- criteria and methods of acquiring knowledge of all types.

However, my inquiry into these questions is strongly characterised by two features, first, the attempt to provide positively useful knowledge and, second, a methodical approach together with the attempt to provide strong justifications. As a consequence, I have dedicated much research to questions of what philosophical theories and methods are, to criteria of knowledge and justification, in particular in ethics, and to acquiring as well as philosophically theorising empirical information which is needed for developing other desired philosophical theories. The following (of course incomplete) presentation, however, does not reflect this systematic order, rather, it highlights some paradigmatic questions and results in a personal order. It contains references to some of my publications, and uses scribal abbreviations which are decoded in the list of publications.

Normative ethics: My research in normative ethics (or more precisely: criteriological ethics) is about the criteria and sources of morality, in particular criteria of social justice.

Basic approaches in normative ethics: I have defended an *axiological approach* in normative ethics, i.e. an approach which takes values to be primary with respect to obligations or virtues and hence defines deontic and aretic notions via axiological notions and not vice versa (sometimes this approach is erroneously called “consequentialism”). This differs from the deontological and the virtue approaches, which take obligations and virtues respectively to be primary. [A62.]

Axiology: moral desirability function: In the axiological part of normative ethics I have developed, in particular, a *prioritarian criterion of moral value* (called “*utilex*”), i.e. a criterion, which, unlike utilitarianism, gives more moral weight to improvements for people who are worse off, more weight the worse off they are, thus operationalising greater concern for these people [B2: 589-632; A32; A66; A77; A108]. Technically, this is done by translating the personal value of a life into a moral value of this life via a concave weighting function, the “*utilex*” function: the x value expresses the personal desirability of a life; and the corresponding y value is the moral value of this personal desirability.

Justification of the moral desirability function: I have justified this criterion via a *model of our expected sympathy* for people one is not personally acquainted with, where negative sympathy, i.e. compassion, is stronger than positive sympathy – which leads to the concavity of the moral desirability function [B2: 589-616; A32; A66; A77].

Deontology: moral obligations: The prioritarian *utilex* criterion is about moral values. In addition, I have developed a criterion of moral obligation: *progressive norm welfarism*, which relies strongly on socially valid norms and the political process of, in the best case, implementing the morally most efficient new norms, thereby morally improving the world in a long-term historical process. Basic moral obligations consist in abiding by the morally good socially valid norms. [B3: 85-88; 93-97.]

Metaethics:

Ethical methodology and criteria for justifying morals: The main focus of my research in metaethics is criteria for good justifications of moral systems and of practical justifications (or practical reasons) in general. An important adequacy condition for practical justification is a certain kind of *internalism*: While the practical justification, on the one hand – like theoretical justification – has to prove or argumentatively justify a certain thesis about the justified object, on the other, as a *practical* justification, it must have a motivating function. In other words, belief in this thesis motivates prudent people – to a certain degree – to adopt and practically realise the justified object. Because motivating is a causal relation, this internalist adequacy condition makes a theory of practical reasons dependent on motivational psychology and empirical decision theory. A deeper elaboration of this internalism leads to an *instrumentalist* conception of morality. [B2: 30-127; A20; A38.2; A41; A73; A74; A78; A114.]

Moral semantics and sources of morality: This solution for the problem of practical justification implies a certain kind of moral semantics, namely a combination of *semantic cognitivism*, which means that moral judgements should be defined in such a way as to have clear and interpersonally verifiable or at least checkable truth conditions, and *adoptive non-cognitivism*, which means that practically adopting moral criteria is not a question of cognition alone but depends on – innate – motives too. Moral judgements should be defined in such a way that this adoption is guaranteed; for prudent subjects the adoption of justified morals should be a question of prudential rationality. [A18; A46.2; A55; A73.]

Applied ethics:

Climate ethics: The biggest portion of my research in applied ethics so far has been dedicated to environmental ethics, and to climate ethics in particular. In a preliminary study, I have assessed various options with respect to greenhouse gas emissions with an entirely welfare ethical methodology; whereas economists assess such options in monetary terms (sometimes including substitutive monetisation for goods without market prices), *welfare ethics* does it in terms of personal utilities, which then are aggregated, according to the respective ethical criterion, e.g. prioritarianism or utilitarianism. (Insofar as I am aware, my study is the only welfarist assessment study of greenhouse gas emission options to date.) Sustainable reduction of emissions turned out to be the morally best option, according to both prioritarian and utilitarian criteria. [B3; A52 – further topics: A91.]

Developmental ethics: Developmental ethics deals – directly or indirectly – with the problems of the, by far, biggest group of humans living in destitution; and many people believe that, apart from feeling moved by these circumstances, it is also a matter of justice that the relatively rich should – more or less massively – help the poor. One part of my research projects in developmental ethics consists in trying to provide theoretical underpinnings for these thoughts

[cf. above]. The criterion of moral obligations intimated above requires that new social norms be established for moral reasons where this is morally most efficient. The situation of the destitute fulfils this condition for several reasons: moral priority as well as high marginal utility because of their miserable condition; often low costs because of purchasing power parity; and misery due to lack of simple technical means, which could quite easily be provided by the more affluent. [A103.]

Further areas of applied ethics: I have contributed to some other fields of applied ethics: general environmental ethics [A34], future ethics [A60, A102], bioethics [A61; A92], economic ethics [A51], ethics of war [A88], ethics of sports [A26].

Theory of rational action / prudential reason:

Desirability theory: Arguably, the best theory of rational utility or prudential desirability so far is the full information approach, developed in particular by Richard Brandt. However, this theory has several crucial problems, which mostly originate specifically from the full information requirement (e.g. since we do not know how we would decide with full and vividly represented information this approach is of no practical help). Therefore, I have developed an *analytic-synthetic theory of prudential desirability*, which avoids these problems and conserves the advantages of the full information approach. The basic idea is to analyse the various ways of how we can decide and to take the best of them as defining rational preferences – where “the best” is understood as being resistant to further information. In this way, the procedural definition of ‘desirability’ and the question of further psychological and situational information about our ways of deciding are separated. [B2: 241-427; A18; A21.]

Intrinsic values: With the help of these criteria and of empirical information about our ways of deciding I have defended a certain type of rational hedonism (“*corrected hedonism*”) as the right theory of intrinsic values. [B2: 428-548; A31; A35.]

Rational decision: Rational decision is neither simply choosing the option believed to be best – this is what we do necessarily in any case, and it does not guarantee a minimum of information or other quality of the decision –, nor, at the other end of the spectrum, does it consist in always trying to obtain the maximum of information about the available options – thereby ignoring the costs and benefits of this information. As an alternative to these extremes, I have developed a theory of *rational decision as optimal decision process*: Apart from the quality of reflection (good criteria and their coherent application), the other major variable of different ways of deciding is the invested effort, measurable for example, in terms of time dedicated to finding better alternatives, relevant consequences etc. Improving these two aspects of a decision (quality and effort) will lead to choosing better options. However, the marginal benefit of these improvements usually diminishes, so that there is an optimum level of decisional effort and quality, i.e. a maximum of the sum of the utilities of the decisional effort and of the chosen

option. It is rational to decide on this optimum level. We can learn to invest this optimum level of deliberation with the help of statistically justified rules of thumb. [A1: 390-404.]

Theory of the good life: According to the theory of intrinsic value, a good life is a (certain kind of) happy life. Psychology of well-being can help tell us which kind of life will make us happy. In particular, I have stressed two of its results, which are highly important for ethics: Higher income makes us happier, but only up to a certain degree (in the US: 75,000 USD/year, according to Kahneman & Deaton); beyond that level its contribution to happiness is nil. Altruistic action is a very stable source of happiness. [B2: 549-576.]

Theory of action: My contributions to action theory have been threefold.

Empirical theory of action: My empirical theory of action tries to systemise psychological findings about our ways of deciding and acting, in the form of a limited set of coherent hypotheses which should be able to explain or describe every part of a decision and which should capture the various ways of deciding and in particular whether these depend on special cognitions. This systematisation provides the empirical foundation for the prudential desirability theory, the theory of rational decision and for ethics, i.e. for all “normative” theories of practical reasons. In particular the systematisation clarifies which ways of deciding can be accessed by acquiring certain knowledge. Without such a psychological or action theoretical foundation the normative theories cannot give useful advice which can be followed. Important parts of this empirical theory of action include the hypothesis that intentions are optimality judgements, hypotheses about the hedonic and other content of our intrinsic desires, a theory of emotional decisions, of automatic actions, as well as explanations of the motivational and cognitive bases of our moral actions. [B2: 128-240; 428-521; B4; A35; A48; A54; A56; A67; A100; A106; A113; A117.]

Reconstructive action theory: A methodically different part of my philosophical action theory is dedicated to clarifying concepts such as ‘action’, ‘intention’, ‘intentional’. The guiding idea behind the resulting definitions is that these concepts have to capture what is valuable and of high practical importance among the natural phenomena in the respective fields. One example for implementing this idea is the definition of ‘intentional’, where understanding why deviant realisations of intentions are bad in at least one respect – namely that they run counter to the idea of control inherent in the concept of action – is the key to resolve this persistent definitional problem. [A48; A75; A84; A103; A104; A109.]

Freedom and responsibility: Still another and methodically different part of my action theory is about freedom and responsibility, where I defend a *compatibilist conception of freedom* as, in its highest form, convergence of prudential rationality and autonomy. Whilst the value of this kind of freedom can easily be explained – for example, free decisions lead to choosing the really best action (or more precisely: to choosing an action which with a high probability is not much worse

than the really best action) – similar justifications of incompatibilist conceptions of freedom are missing. The concept of *retrospective responsibility*, on the other hand, is defined within a theory of social control of the course of the world, where ‘being responsible’, (very) roughly, means to be a good starting point for exerting such control. [A57; A93; A113; A115; A117; A118.]

Moral psychology: In moral psychology I have developed a theory of the various *motives for acting morally*. A particular focus of the respective study [A50] is which of these motives are apt for defining a moral desirability function. – An outline of an ontogenetic *psychology of moral judgements* shows that in order for moral judgments to be stable in cases of acquiring new knowledge, they have to be founded on motives independent of moral considerations in the narrow sense, for example, on sympathy or respect. [A50: 20-24; A55.] – I have scrutinised the mechanisms and strength of sympathy in particular detail [B2: 589-616; A40]. – Furthermore, I have scrutinised and analysed research in moral psychology and moral physiology and its role for normative ethics [A105].

Theory of argumentation:

The epistemological approach to argumentation and the practical theory of argument: I have developed an *epistemological theory of argumentation*, called “practical theory of argument”, which takes the production of knowledge or cognition (in the sense of justified belief) to be the standard function of argumentation. In other words, according to this approach, arguments are instruments for acquiring knowledge or cognition. This conception is in contrast to e.g. rhetorical or consensualistic approaches, which strive for changing the addressee’s belief or for consensus, irrespective of the truth of these beliefs, or an empiricist approach that does not try to fulfil a certain function. (Specific critiques of some of these approaches, e.g.: A71, A101, A111.) Other defenders of the epistemic approach include: Mark Battersby, John Biro, Richard Feldman, James Freeman, Alvin Goldman, Harvey Siegel, Mark Weinstein [cf. A70]. Some of the distinguishing features of my particular approach are:

- a detailed analysis of the *functional principle of rationally convincing* by arguments (namely: guiding the addressee in a process of recognising the truth of the claim);
- the separation of *validity criteria* for arguments, which define the features of a functioning instrument and whose observance implies the truth or high probability of the claim, from *adequacy conditions*, which are rules for the good usage of those instruments for rationally convincing;
- the use of *epistemological principles*, taken from other philosophical disciplines, as the epistemic foundation for constructing epistemically valuable arguments and different argument schemes: in particular the principle of deductive implication, which is taken from logic; the principles of probability calculus; definitions of ‘(prudential) desirability’ or ‘utility’ taken from rational decision theory. [B1; A37; A68; A69.]

Various fields of argumentation theory: On the basis of this practical approach, I have developed several parts of a full-blown epistemological theory of argumentation: precise criteria for valid and adequate arguments in general [B1: 51-76; A68: sects. 6 and 8] and for several special types of arguments (deductive arguments [B1: 180-209], probabilistic arguments [A94], practical arguments for value judgements [B1: 319-433; A107], genesis of knowledge arguments (arguments from authority, historiographic arguments, arguments from testimony ...) [B1: 246-260], interpretive arguments [B1: 221-246; A17; A86], Pascal arguments (practical arguments for empirical claims) [A27], ethical arguments [A79; A83], practical justifications [A38.2]), arguments from (visual) models [A112]; a systematisation of argument types and schemes [A97]; a theory of fallacies [A42]; an approach to interpreting (ordinary language) arguments [A59; A119; B1: 85-163]; a theory of argument and justification strength [A116]; a theory of truth-oriented argumentative dialogues [A1; A15].

Intercultural universality of argument types: I have applied the criteria for good arguments also to arguments from non-Western culture to test their universal applicability and to perhaps find completely different good argument types [A110].

Metaphilosophy: My main contribution to metaphilosophy is a theory of philosophical theories, which reconstructs the types of currently existing clear and sensible theories in philosophy – “sensible” in that they provide reliable results of practical importance. The primary focus of this metaphilosophy is on the type of content of philosophical theories: which kinds of (systems of) hypotheses do philosophical theories try to establish? The methodological question is derivative: which methods can establish the desired kind of knowledge? I have found three types of philosophical theories: 1. *descriptive-nomological theories* (they try to provide empirical laws or regularities and explanations – as e.g. in cosmology or moral psychology or philosophical anthropology in general), 2. *idealising-hermeneutic theories* (they try to capture the practical sense of human constructs – e.g. in philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of science, ethics, theory of argumentation), and 3. *technical-constructive theories* (they try to improve already known instruments or to invent new useful ones – most of the idealising-hermeneutic theories have technical constructive counterparts, so e.g. logic, philosophy of science, ethics and theory of argumentation, etc., also have technical-constructive parts). [A96; B1: 10-21; A2.]

Constructive philosophy: I have developed philosophical theories of all three types – which is also visible e.g. in my three kinds of contributions to action philosophy. I especially like the constructive aspect of philosophy, particularly inherent in technical constructive theories. Even good philosophical and metaphilosophical epistemologies and methodologies have this constructive feature. And only the stringent and enlightening use of the epistemological principles and methods (re-)constructed by them leads to clear, reliable, systematic and valuable findings.

5. Talks and Conference Papers since 2005

(Last update 6.12.2019)

- 19.1.2005, University of Aachen, Germany: *Von moralischen Werten zu moralischen Pflichten.*
- 12.3.2005, University of Siena, Certosa di Pontignano, Italy, Conference "Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy - The Action Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy": *Practical Reasons Empirically.*
- 11.4.2005, University of Siegen, Germany: *Moralische Gebote - ein wertethischer Ansatz.*
- 11.5.2005, University of Siena, Italy, Graduate School "Scienze cognitive": *Causazione Mentale - Eventi come relati della causazione.*
- 20.6.2005, Milano, Università Cattolica: *Che cos'è un'intenzione? Un'analisi dal punto di vista concettuale ed empirico.*
- 22.6.2005, University of Zürich, Forschungsstelle Ethik: *Vom Primat der Werte - Wertethik versus Pflicht- und Tugendethik.*
- 25.10.2005, University of Bayreuth: *Begrenzter Vorrang für Schlechtgestellte - prioritaristische Verteilungsgerechtigkeit.*
- 27.10.2005, University of Konstanz: *Rationaler Altruismus und moralische Pflichten.*
- 2.2.2006, University of Bayreuth: *Soziale Normen, moralische Normen und moralische Werte.*
- 3.2.2006, University of Osnabrück: *Absichten - analytisch und empirisch.*
- 28.2.2006, University of Firenze: *Teorie della giustizia e ordine internazionale.*
- 21.4.2006, University of Salzburg, opening lecture of the "3. Salzburger Rhetoriktag": *Überreden ist gut, überzeugen ist besser! Argumentativer Ethos in der Rhetorik.*
- 21.4.2006, University of Salzburg, Salzburger Rhetoriktag: *Kognitivismus und praktische Begründung.*
- 29.6.2006, University of Amsterdam, 6th ISSA International Conference on Argumentation: *The Function of Argumentation and Pragma-Dialectics.*
- 12.9.2006, GAP VI 2006, Free University Berlin: *Absichten - begrifflich und empirisch.*
- 13.9.2006, GAP VI, 2006, Free University Berlin: *Höffe's Theorie politischer Gerechtigkeit.*
- 16.9.2006, University of Potsdam, conference "Antecedents of Actions - Reasons, Decisions, Intentions, and Will": *Intentional Causality and the Concept 'Intention'.*
- 20.10.2006, University Roma III, Workshop on Robert Audi's Philosophy: *Robert Audi's "Rationality and the Good - An Overview" - A Comment.*
- 21.10.2006, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technology, CNR, Roma, Workshop "Understanding Intentional Action": *An Empirical Theory of Intentions.*
- 28.1.2007, University of Kassel, Germany: *Von moralischen Werten zu moralischen Normen.*

- 13.3.2007, University of Florence: *Teorie della giustizia e ordine internazionale*.
- 14.3.2007, University of Siena, colloquium "Persone nello stato vegetativo permanente": *Persone nello stato vegetativo permanente - loro stato morale, loro diritti morali*.
- 25.6.2007, University of Bremen: *Begründungskonzepte in der Ethik*.
- 26.6.2007, University of Bremen: *Argumentationstheorie und Logik*.
- 26.6.2007, University of Bremen: *Der erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz in der Argumentationstheorie*.
- 28.6.2007, University of Bremen: *Rationaler Altruismus und moralische Pflichten*.
- 17.10.2007, University of Siena, Pontignano, conference "Etica normativa - principi dell'agire morale": *Valori e norme morali nel prioritarismo*.
- 13.11.2007, University of Osnabrück, Department of Cognitive Science: *Intentions and Empirical Decision Theory*.
- 15.11.2007, University of Osnabrück, Department of Philosophy: *Umweltethik. Das Problem des Klimawandels*.
- 29.5.2008, University of Siena, Workshop with Robert Audi: *Robert Audi's Intuitionism - A Reply*.
- 31.5.2008, University of Heidelberg: *Die Disanalogie von Ethik und Wissenschaft. Zu Gerhard Ernsts Buch "Die Objektivität der Moral"*.
- 22.8.2008, ECAP 6 (6th European Congress of Analytical Philosophy), Krakow: *The Volitional and the Executive Function of Intentions*.
- 16.9.2008, XXI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie, Essen: *Ethische Argumentationen für moralische Prinzipien und der Theorietyp der materialen Ethik*.
- 4.10.2008, University of Pittsburgh, 8th Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science: *How to Interpret Human Actions, Including Moral Actions?*
- 6.10.2008, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IL: *Prioritarianism - a Specification and a Justification*.
- 5.11.2008, University of Kassel, lecture series "Grundpositionen zeitgenössischer Ethik": *Vorrang für Schlechtergestellte - eine prioritaristische Theorie der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit*.
- 3.3.2009, University of Innsbruck: *Methoden der Moralbegründung*.
- 13.5.2009, Incontri del Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze Sociali, University of Siena: *Una prospettiva laica sullo stato vegetativo permanente*.
- 20.5.2009, Seminario: Etica dei trapianti, University of Siena: *Etica della donazione degli organi*.
- 15.9.2009, Conference "GAP 7", University of Bremen: *Verantwortung - Theorieskizze mit Anwendungen*.

- 16.9.2009, Conference "GAP 7", University of Bremen: *Menschen im permanenten vegetativen Zustand - ihr moralischer Status, ihre moralischen Rechte.*
- 18.9.2009, Workshop "Freiheit und Verantwortung. Revolutioniert die Kognitionswissenschaft Recht und Moral", University of Bremen: *Ist Verantwortungszuschreibung unfair?*
- 4.11.2009, University College Dublin: *An Empirical Theory of Practical Reasons and its Use for Practical Philosophy.*
- 6.11.2009, Philosophy Colloquium, Trinity College, Dublin: *From Moral Value to Moral Obligation.*
- 30.6.2010, 7th International ISSA Conference on Argumentation, University of Amsterdam: *Probabilistic Arguments in the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation.*
- 14.9.2010, Dillingen a.d.Donau, Germany: *Gutes Leben und Ökonomie des Glücks.*
- 16.9.2010, Conference "La natura della coscienza", University of Messina: *Good Conscience, Bad Conscience - Moral Sentiments from Self-Esteem to Shame.*
- 20.9.2010, 2010 LabSi Conference: "Neuroscience and Decision Making", University of Siena: *Emotional Decisions. The Induction-of-Intrinsic-Desires Hypothesis.*
- 25.9.2010, 2010 SIFA Conference, University of Padova: *Attributive Responsibility - an Outline.*
- 1.10.2010, Conference "Ethische Aspekte des Geoengineering", Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald: *Geoengineering und Risikoethik - Überlegungen zum globalen Klimamanagement aus der Sicht des Progressiven Normenprioritarismus.*
- 11.10.2010, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Goethe-Institut Sarajewo: *Unsere moralische Verantwortung in Sachen Klimawandel.*
- 4.2.2011, University of Osnabrück, Symposion „Geist und Moral“: *Der Primat der Leidensverminderung. Von neminem laede zum Prioritarismus.*
- 10.3.2011, University of Siena, giornata di studio „Studi di filosofia della mente“: *Motivi e ragioni per l'agire – in particolare per l'agire morale.*
- 4.4.2011, University College Dublin, Department of Philosophy: *Humans in Permanent Vegetative State – Their Moral Status, Their Moral Rights.*
- 5.4.2011, University College Dublin, Department of Political Sciences: *Morals, Politics and Law.*
- 6.4.2011, University College Dublin: *Emotional Decisions – The Induction-of-Intrinsic-Desires Hypothesis.*
- 6.4.2011, University College Dublin, Colloquium Political Sciences: *Climate Change, Intergenerational Justice and Development.*
- 14.4.2011, University of Firenze, Giornata di studio “Etica e natura umana”: *Una strategia razionale per basare la morale su inclinazioni naturali.*

- 20.5.2011, 9th OSSA-Conference, University of Windsor, Canada: *Subjunctive Tu quoque Arguments*.
- 21.5.2011, 9th OSSA-Conference, University of Windsor, Canada: *Argument Schemes – An Epistemological Approach*.
- 7.6.2011, Conference “Ethical and Moral Aspects of Naturalising the Mind”, University of Siena: *Responsibility in Times of the Naturalised Mind – Is Ascriptive Responsibility Unfair?*
- 15.9.2011, XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, University of München: *The Volitional and the Executive Function of Intentions*.
- 7.12.2011, University of Saarbrücken: *Drei Arten philosophischer Theorien*.
- 18.9.2012, GAP, University of Konstanz: *Willensschwäche – Eine Systematisierung und eine Erklärung*.
- 21.9.2012, GAP, University of Konstanz: *Comments on Georg Brun’s and Hans Rott’s “Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision”*.
- 21.9.2012, GAP, University of Konstanz: *Comment on Douglas Walton’s Paper „Argumentation Methods of Argument Reconstruction”*.
- 7.5.2013, University of Siena, CIRCaP: *The Moral Value of Democracy*.
- 24.5.2013, OSSA Conference, University of Windsor, Canada: *Practical Arguments for Prudential Justifications of Actions*.
- 25.6.2013, University of Osnabrück: *Persons – Development and Action*.
- 26.6.2013, University of Osnabrück: *Motive zur Befolgung moralischer Normen*.
- 26.6.2013, University of Osnabrück: *Emotional Decisions - The Induction-of-Intrinsic-Desires Hypothesis*. (26.6.13, Vortrag im Institut für Kognitionswissenschaften der Universität Osnabrück, Affectivity-Reading-Club von Achim Stephan. A100-A133\100EmotionalDecisions_V3_Osnabrück_130626.doc, pdf, ppt. (Der Vortrag ist eine minimale Überarbeitung des Vortrags V2_UCD_110406, der selbst wiederum die Vorfassung für den veröffentlichten Artikel war.) 50 min.)
- 25.9.2013, University of Siena, DISPOC: *Professionalità nella politica da un punto di vista morale*.
- 14.11.2013, University of Rotterdam, *Reasons and Conscious Control in Automatic Actions*.
- 24.1.2014, University of Göttingen: *Individualismus in der Wohlfahrtsethik – zwischen Aggregation und Grundrechten*.
- 3.2.2014, University of Tübingen: *Der erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz in der Argumentationstheorie*.
- 2.7.2014, ISSA conference, University of Amsterdam: *Ethical Arguments for Moral Principles*. (2.7.2014, Amsterdam, 8th International ISSA (International Society for the Study of Argumentation) Conference on Argumentation.

- D0049_EthicalArgumentsForMoralPrinciples_V_ISSA_140702.doc & pdf mit Powerpoint-Präsentation: D0049_...F_ISSA_140702.ppt; 20 min.)
- 2.7.2014, ISSA conference, University of Amsterdam: *Islamic Theological Arguments – An Epistemological Systematisation (with Serkan Ince)*.
- 3.9.2014, SIFA, L'Aquila: *Freedom of Decision – Autonomy and Rationality*.
- 12.9.2014, University of York, Canada: *An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation – the Practical Theory of Argumentation*.
- 18.9.2014, University of Windsor, Canada, CRRAR: *An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation – the Practical Theory of Argumentation*.
- 24.9.2014, University of Toronto, Centre for Ethics: *Constructing Morals and the Aims of Morality*.
- 29.9.2014, DGPhil, Münster, Germany: *Person, Selbst, Ich – ein handlungstheoretischer Ansatz*.
- 1.7.2015, University of Saarbrücken: *Moralischer Normenwelfarismus: Von moralischen Werten zu moralischen Geboten*.
- 2.7.2015, University of Saarbrücken: *Person, Selbst, Ich – ein handlungstheoretischer Ansatz*.
- 16.9.2015, GAP conference, University of Osnabrück: *Unconscious Motives and Actions – Agency and Responsibility*.
- 1.12.2015, University of Mannheim: *Individuelle Verantwortung in der Wirtschaft*.
- 2.12.2015, University of Tübingen: *Moralische Bewertungen und Pflichten - Eine allgemeine Konzeption und ihre Anwendung auf humanitäre Interventionen*.
- 22.2.2016, University of Tübingen: *Epistemological Argumentation Theory and Theological Arguments – Fundamentals and Case Studies on Medieval Islam*.
- 20.5.2016, OSSA conference, University of Windsor, Canada: *Appeals to Visual Models. An Epistemological Reconstruction of an Argument Type – Commentary on “On Appeals to (Visual) Models”*.
- 21.5.2016, OSSA conference, University of Windsor, Canada: *Walton’s Argumentation Schemes*.
- 25.5.2016, University of Siena: *Teoria dell’argomentazione tradizionale e attuale – un confronto*.
- 9.6.2016, University of Siena: *Etica dell’amministrazione – Responsabilità morale nell’amministrazione pubblica*.
- 10.6.2016, Sulingen, Germany, via streaming: *Flüchtlingskrise in Europa – eine moralphilosophische Perspektive*.
- 28.6.2016, Stuttgart, Stiftung Effektiver Altruismus: *Effektiver Altruismus – Eine bessere Welt durch Spenden?*
- 19.7.2016, University of Saarbrücken: *Moralischer Subjektivismus und das Problem der Stärke subjektiver Reaktionen*.

- 20.7.2016, University of Saarbrücken: *Zuschreibende Verantwortung – Sinn, Bedeutung, Begründung.*
- 6.9.2016, SIFA conference, University of Pistoia: *Unconscious Motives and Actions – Agency and Responsibility.*
- 8.10.2016, Conference of the Foundation for Effective Altruism: *Rationaler Altruismus – Eine Begründung moralischen Engagements.*
- 18.10.2016, Conference at the University of Siena: *Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini.*
- 7.11.2016, University of Göttingen, Centre for Theories and Methods of Cultural Sciences: *Argumentationstypen und Theorien – der erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz in der Argumentationstheorie.*
- 14.12.2016, University of Siena, lecture series of “Rethinking Economics Siena”: *Eguaglianza economica e giustizia distributiva.*
- 7.4.2017, University Roma 3 in Rome, talk in the Workshop: “On war and terrorism”: *Humanitarian interventions – A consequentialist conception.*
- 26.5.2017, Rome, paper presented at the conference “Etica e responsabilità”, organized by the Società Italiana di Filosofia Morale: *Responsabilità attributiva – senso, precisazione e soluzione del problema profondo.*
- 21.6.2017, Fribourg (CH), paper presented at the European Conference on Argumentation (ECA) 2017: *Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach.*
- 26.8.2017. Munich, paper presented at the European Conference for Analytical Philosophy: *Weakness of Will – A Systematization and Explanation.*
- 30.10.17, Berlin, Humboldt University, paper presented at the conference “Politische Meinungsverschiedenheiten”: *Deep Political Disagreement, Deliberative Democracy, and the Implementation of Morals.*
- 16.1.2018, Colle di Val d’Elsa, talk at the Liceo Alessandro Volta: *Virtù morali.*
- 19.3.2018, Rome, talk given at the conference “Moral Disagreement”, at der Australian Catholic University, Rom: *Placement versus Argumentation – Commentary on: Garrett Cullity: „Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust and Complacency“.*
- 9.4.2018: Torino, talk given in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Torino: *Quale priorità per chi sta peggio? Prioritarismo morale e sue applicazioni.*
- 17.5.2018: Siena, talk given in the lecture series "Medicina 22", organized by the Contrada del Leocorno: *Testamento di fine vita. Incontro tra la morale e la legge.*
- 28.5.2018. Siena, talk given in the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences: *La precarizzazione economica per esempio – lineamenti di una valutazione etica e un programma di ricerca interdisciplinare.*

- 4.7.2018, Amsterdam, paper presented at the Conference of the International Society of the Study of Argumentation: *Recognizing Argument Types and Adding Missing Reasons*.
- 25.7.2018: Karlsruhe (Germany), paper presented at the conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS): *From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism – an Empathy-Based Internalist Foundation of Welfare Ethics*.
- 27.7.2018, Karlsruhe (Germany), paper presented at the satellite workshop "Prioritarianism": *How to Define 'Prioritarianism' and Distinguish It from (Moderate) Egalitarianism*.
- 12.9.2018, Reykjavik, University of Iceland, talk given in the Philosophical Department: *Constructing morals – progressive norm prioritarianism*.
- 31.10.2018, Kassel (Germany), University of Kassel, talk given in the Philosophy Department: *Die moralische Bedeutung der Demokratie*.
- 25.6.2019, Groningen, paper presented at the European Conference on Argumentation: *Arguments from Expert Opinion – An Epistemological Approach*.
- 27.6.2019, Groningen, talk given at European Conference on Argumentation: *The Epistemic Function of Argumentation, Dissent and Discussion – Comment on José Ángel Gascón's Essay*.
- 12.7.2019, Salzburg (Austria), paper presented at the conference "Analytische Explikationen & Interventionen": *Wie effizient sollen Altruisten handeln?*
- 26.9.2019, Salzburg (Austria), talk given at the panel "Wissensfortschritt in der (Politischen) Ethik / normativen politischen Theorie?" at the V. Kongress für Praktische Philosophie: *(Wissens-)Fortschritte in der Politischen Ethik*.
- 27.9.2019, Siena, talk given at the workshop "Solidarity – A Multi-Level and Interdisciplinary Perspective", organized by the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences: *Solidarity - Claims, Mechanisms and Budgeting*.
- 4.10.2019, Oxford, paper presented at the conference "Free Will and Economic Theory", Las Casas Institute, Blackfriars Hall: *Freedom of decision and responsibility – their significance for economy*.
- 24.10.2019, Poznan (Poland), talk given at the Workshop of Working Group 2 of the COST Project "Argumentation and Public Policy Analysis (APPLY)": *Norms for Evaluating Public Arguments – An Epistemological and Moral Perspective*.

6. Research Organisation: Research Projects, Funding and Conferences Organised

6.1. Grants

1982-1984 Doctoral scholarship of the Heinrich-Heine-Stiftung, Germany.

- 1994 Three months travel grant of the German National Research Council (DFG).
- 2014 Travel grant of the University of Toronto in cooperation with the University of Siena for a visiting fellowship at the University of Toronto.

6.2. Research Projects and Funding

- 2000-2002 Research project "Wie gut ist das Leben?" ("How good is life?"), financed by the German National Research Council (DFG) at the University of Osnabrück. Directors: Wolfgang Lenzen and Rainer Trapp; leading researcher (scientific conception, management, main research): Christoph Lumer; further researcher: one psychologist. 255.000 DM (=130.379,43 €).
- 2003-2005 Partecipation in the Research Project of National Interest (PRIN) "Rappresentazione e ragionamento. Uno studio dei processi mentali dal punto di vista della filosofia analitica e delle scienze cognitive", Siena Research group "Rappresentazioni mentali, credenze e verità tra internismo e naturalismo" directed by Sandro Nannini. Financing by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research for the Siena group: 34.800 €.
- 2005 Research and conference organisation "Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy - The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy". Financing mainly by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Germany: 13.971 €.
- 2005-2007 Partecipation in a Research Project of National Interest (PRIN), Siena Research group directed by Sandro Nannini. Financing by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research for the Siena group: 24.143 €.
- 2007-2009 Partecipation in a Research Project of National Interest (PRIN), Siena Research group directed by Sandro Nannini. Financing by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Research for the Siena group: 44.286 €.
- 2012-2015 Partecipation in a Research Project of National Interest (PRIN), Research group University Roma III, directed by Mario de Caro. Financing by the Italian Ministry for Education.

6.3. Conferences organised

- 17-18.11.2001 "Greenhouse Effect", international conference at the University of Siena, organised together with Sandro Nannini.

- 11-13.3.2005 "Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy - The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy", international conference at the Certosa di Pontignano, Italy, organised together with Sandro Nannini.
- 16.-18.10.2007 "Etica normativa – Principi dell'agire morale", conference of Italian normative ethicists at the Certosa di Pontignano, Italy.
- 29.5.2008 "The practical philosophy of Robert Audi", workshop with Robert Audi.
- 7-8.6. 2011 "Ethical and Moral Aspects of Naturalising the Mind", international conference at the University of Siena.
- 18.10.2016 "Dalla filosofia dell'azione alla filosofia della mente – Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini", conference in honour of Sandro Nannini on the philosophy of action and philosophy of mind.

7. Honours

- 10.12.1986 Award of the University of Münster for the 1986 best dissertations.
- 9.7.2003 Workshop of the Philosophical Department of the University of Salzburg (Austria) on Christoph Lumer's Theory of Argumentation.
- 21.4.2006 Opening and keynote lecture for the conference "3. Salzburger Rhetoriktage" at the University of Salzburg (Austria).

8. Participation in and Service to the Scientific Community

Membership in scientific societies:

International Society for the Study of Argumentation, ISSA;
 Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, Germany;
 Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica, Italy;
 Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Germany;
 Associazione di Pratica e Teoria dell'Argomentazione, ERGO, Italy;
 Società Italiana di Filosofia Morale, Italy.

Membership in editorial boards of scientific journals:

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice;
 Informal Logic;
 Intergenerational Justice Review.

Referee for scientific journals:

Argumenta;
 Argumentation;

Cognitive Science;
Erkenntnis;
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice;
Informal Logic;
Intergenerational Justice Review;
Philosophical Explorations;
Philosophical Papers;
Philosophical Psychology;
Philosophical Quarterly;
Ratio Juris;
Theoria.

Referee for scientific publishers:

MIT-Press;
Oxford University Press;
Palgrave Macmillan, UK.

Referee in habilitation procedures:

University of Tübingen, Germany;
University of Turku, Finland.

Other activity as referee:

Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) (German Academic Exchange Service);
Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, conference contributions (GAP, Germany);
Accreditation of Philosophy Courses in Germany;
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Germany (DFG);
Schweizer Nationalfonds (SNF);
Italian Ministry of Education and Science (MIUR);
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research;
Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt, Germany;
Wissenschaftsfonds Österreich, Austria (FWF);
European Conference of Argumentation, conference contributions (ECA);
University of Udine (Italy), research funding.

9. Further Information and Access to My Publications

For further information about me as well as access to my publications you can consult my webpage:

www.lumer.info

