Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation

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Abstract: This contribution discusses some problems of Pragma-Dialectics and explains them by its consensualistic view of the function of argumentation and by its philosophical underpinnings. It is suggested that these problems can be overcome by relying on a better epistemology and on an epistemological theory of argumentation.

On the one hand Pragma-Dialectics takes unqualified consensus as the aim of argumentation, which is problematic, (sect. 2) on the other it includes strong epistemological and rationalistic elements (sect. 3). The problematic philosophical underpinnings of Pragma-Dialectics, specifically Critical Rationalism as well as Logical Constructivism and Dialogic Logic of the Erlangen School, are among the sources of this incoherence (sect. 4). A detailed critique of the Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules shows the negative consequences of this foundation and indicates how they could be avoided (sects. 5-6).

Keywords: Pragma-Dialectics, function of argumentation, consensualism, unqualified consensus, epistemological theory of argumentation, epistemological rationality, discussion rules, Dialogic Logic, Logical Constructivism, Erlangen-School, Münchhausen-Trilemma, externalization

1. Introduction: Pragma-Dialectics and the Aims of this Paper

During the last 25 years Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst have very impressively developed Pragma-Dialectics, i.e. a consensualistic theory of argumentative discourse, which sees the elimination or resolution of a difference of opinion as the aim of such discourses and of argumentation. Currently this is the most famous and most discussed approach in argumentation theory in the world. This theory was first presented in monographic form in 1982 [E&G 1982]. The first and standard presentation in English, i.e. the translation of the 1982 monograph, appeared in 1984
[E&G 1984] and already contained the rules for conducting a rational discussion, which make up the core of this theory [ibid., ch. 7]. It is really amazing how Van Eemeren and Grootendorst since then have expanded their theory, with the help of many collaborators, bringing it to a quasi-industrial level of production, such that it now deals with nearly every aspect of argumentative discourse and argumentation. The most recent extensive exposition of Pragma-Dialectics appeared in 2004 [E&G 2004]. Though some details have been changed and many applications have been added, the core ideas, with few exceptions, have remained unchanged. Therefore the most detailed English exposition of this core is still the 1984 monograph.

In what follows I will discuss Pragma-Dialectics mainly from an epistemological standpoint, i.e. what this theory has to tell us with respect to acquiring true or justified beliefs and knowledge.

**Technical note:** The discussion rules are the constructional core of Pragma-Dialectics; in addition to a few material changes and to stylistic improvements, these rules have undergone a change in numbering. In this text I will refer to their first English version [E&G 1984, 151-175] as "Ro1" etc. ("original (or old) rule no. 1") and to their most recent statements [E&G 2003; 2004, 135-157]¹ as "Rs1" etc. ("Rule in 'Systematic Theory of Argumentation' no. 1"). The material changes regard, first, the possibilities of defending (or attacking) a premise [Ro9/Rs7 (E&G 1984, 168; 2004, 147 f.)]; the originally lacking possibility of argumentatively defending a premise has been included, which is a clear improvement.² The second and most important change concerns the argument schemes that may be used for defending a claim: originally only deductive arguments were permitted, now non-deductive argument schemes have been added [Ro10/Rs8 (E&G 1984, 169; 2004, 150)] - a substantial improvement. Some further changes are merely technical in nature.³ The following discussion usually refers only to the best version.
2. The Pragma-Dialectical Aim of Argumentation and Argumentative Discourse: Elimination of a Difference of Opinion

The whole approach of Pragma-Dialectics is constructed starting from one central theorem about the function of argumentative discourse and argumentation in general. The aim of argumentative discourse and of argumentation, as these are seen and constructed by Pragma-Dialectics, is to eliminate or resolve a difference of (expressed) opinion [e.g. E&G 1984, 1; 1992, xiii; 10; 2004, 52; 57; Eemeren et al. 1996, 277] or to resolve a dispute - where "dispute" is understood as: expressed difference of opinion [e.g. E&G 1984, 2; 3; 151]. This resolution has taken place if the participants both agree about the opinion in question (or if the protagonist withdraws his standpoint) [Eemeren et al. 1996, 280; E&G 2004, 133]. The central task of the theory is to develop rules for rational discussions or discourses; and the value of the rules to be developed is regarded as being identical to the extent to which these rules help to attain the goal of resolving disputes [E&G 1984, 151; 152; cf. 2004, 132-134].

This, obviously, is a consensualistic conception of argumentative discourse and of argumentation, which aims at an unqualified consensus, i.e. a consensus that is not subjected to further conditions. Consensualism defines a clear aim for argumentation and argumentative discourse, which can be the basis for developing a complete argumentation theory, including criteria for good argumentation, good discourse, theory of fallacies, theory of argumentation interpretation, etc. Thus, consensus theory in general, and Pragma-Dialectics in particular, is a full-fledged approach to argumentation theory. Similar and competing full-fledged approaches are, first, the rhetorical approach, which sees convincing an addressee, i.e. creating or raising an addressee's belief in a thesis, as the aim of argumentation [e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958; Hamblin 1970; Tindale 2004], and, second, the epistemological approach, which sees generating the addressee's justified belief in the argumentation's thesis as the standard function of argumentation [e.g. Biro & Siegel 1992; Feldman 1994; Goldman 1999, ch. 5; Johnson 2000; Lumer 1990; 1991; 2005/2006; Siegel & Biro 1997]. As opposed to epistemological theories, both consensus theory and rhetoric aim at an unqualified belief (though in Pragma-Dialectics this is more an expression of a belief than the belief
itself); but consensus theory then, unlike rhetoric, requires that both participants share
this opinion.  

It is quite astonishing that even though Van Eemeren and Grootendorst repeat
their aim for argumentative discourse, i.e. dispute resolution, countless times, they
practically do not justify this most central assumption of their approach. They
incidentally justify the need for dispute resolution with the remark that "otherwise we
become intellectually isolated and can ultimately even end up in a state of spiritual and
mental inertia" [E&G 1984, 1]. However, "not being intellectually isolated" could be
an euphemism for "conformism". Of course, not being intellectually isolated is good;
but it is of secondary importance. It is much more important that one's beliefs be true
(and justifiedly true) and thus can help one orient herself or himself in the world.
Intellectual isolation could simply be the price of truth, or more precisely, of justified
true beliefs that others are not able or not willing to understand or accept - think of
Galileo or Frege.

Why in case of an explicit difference of opinion do people not simply consent to
the other's opinion? Of course, usually it is because they believe what they have
expressed! And why do they not simply change their beliefs in such a case of dispute?
Aside from the fact that this is psychologically difficult [Pascal 1669, 957 (Lafuma no.
418 / Brunschwig no. 233)], this is so because people usually have (good or bad)
reasons for their beliefs. They have acquired their beliefs by procedures that are, 
hopefully, connected to truth conditions for the believed propositions in such a way that
following these procedures guarantees acceptability, i.e. truth, high probability or
verisimilitude, of one's beliefs. Of course, not all procedures actually used satisfy this
condition; however when reflecting on this, people somehow believe or hope that the
procedures they use fulfil this condition. And they hope for this because true beliefs
help to orient themselves in the world. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not pose
these simple questions even though the answers should be crucial for coming to terms
with the aim of resolving a dispute. Obviously the answers just hinted at first go in an
epistemic and then in an epistemological direction of conceiving argumentation and
resolving differences of opinion.
So what is the problem with conflicting beliefs and why is it important to resolve differences of opinion? The most simple and straightforward answer is: At least one of these opinions must be false. And having false opinions means having a false and disorienting picture of the world, which can make us miss our goals. What is completely missing in Pragma-Dialectics is any systematic relation to truth or its epistemological counterparts, knowledge and justified belief. Consequently the respective terms do not show up in the subject indices of the major works of Pragma-Dialecticians.) Pragma-Dialectics has this in common with rhetorical approaches. Aiming at unqualified beliefs or shared beliefs that are not systematically related to truth in the sense that they are true or (because of the epistemologically founded cognizing procedures used) at least acceptable in the sense of being true, probably true or truth-like, of course, leads to much less true or truth-like beliefs than aiming at justified beliefs. The consequence is much less orientation and more disorientation about the world's real state, which, finally, leads to more grossly suboptimum or even disastrous decisions. This was already Socrates' and Plato's critique of rhetorical argumentation theory [e.g. Plato, Phaedrus 259e-262c; Gorgias 452e-455d; 458e-460a; Philebos 58a-59b]. To aim at unqualified consensus instead of unqualified belief of a single person does not make the situation any better because truth does not depend on anyone sharing it but on objective fulfilment of truth conditions. Of course, an unqualified consensus can be true; but it would be true by chance and thus not reliable. One could try to justify unqualified consensus as the aim of discourse along the line that consensus would resolve social conflicts. But, first, such a resolution could be obtained also by a qualified consensus with true beliefs. And, second, since aside from trying to resolve social conflicts, people also aim at true beliefs, the conflict resolution obtained via shared false beliefs would be fragile; it would be threatened by any new piece of knowledge the participants acquire, which could lead them to doubt the consensus they had reached. A consensus theory of discourse seems to have at least one advantage over rhetorical approaches, namely that it does not permit deliberately deceiving people by convincing them of a thesis that the arguer himself thinks to be false. But if the arguer's beliefs are as little related to truth as are those of the addressee this does not really amount to an advantage because there is still no systematic link to truth (Socrates and Plato already saw this [Plato, Gorgias 454e-455d; 458e-460a; Phaidros 259e-262c]). The deceiving plan may back-fire: the
arguer believes something false; cheating the addressee perhaps would have made the addressee believe something true; abstaining from cheating and reaching consensus instead leads both to believe the false.

A characteristic of Pragma-Dialectics that distinguishes it from other consensualistic approaches in argumentation theory is "externalization" [E&G 1984, 4-7; 69-72; 2004, 52-55; 77; 135 f.; Eemeren et al. 1996, 276 f.], i.e. a certain way of dealing only with explicit speech acts and not with opinions. (So the usual speech-act theoretical sincerity requirement, that you must believe what you claim, e.g. is replaced by a "responsibility condition", that one only has to bear the conversational consequences of one's speech-acts [E&G 1992, 32 f.; 2004, 77].) According to Pragma-Dialectics, following externalization, the specific aim of argumentative discourse is resolution of an explicit dispute by an explicit acceptance of the others' standpoint and not simply consensus, i.e. reaching shared opinions [E&G 1984, 6; 152; cf. 2004, 154]. Although it is true that discussants usually believe what they say this is not necessarily so. Therefore, "argumentative discourse" may be reduced to an empty game of exchanging phrases nobody believes in. And even if discussants were obliged to be sincere this would not resolve another problem of externalization. In case of a conflict between an explicit assertion and an opinion, externalization gives priority to the former; so, according to the Pragma-Dialectical discourse rules, a protagonist can be forced to explicitly retract a thesis that he still justifiedly believes to be true [cf. E&G 1984, 174, Ro17; E&G 2004, 154, Rs14]. The reason for this is that the dispute resolution rule (Ro17/Rs14) requires that the protagonist retract a thesis he was unable to defend towards the specific antagonist; but this may simply be the case because the antagonist has less knowledge than the protagonist so that the latter cannot use his extra-knowledge (reasons or reasoning schemes) to convince the former. This means the rules can lead to an empty consensus of assertions that does not correspond to the real conflict of opinions. In the specific case it leads to muzzling the informed and to a dictatorship of the ignorant, where the ignorant would even be confirmed in their ignorance by the protagonist's publicly retracting his thesis.

All in all, introducing the externalization requirement into consensualism makes the case worse for this theory. Probably this introduction simply rests on a false
inference. Of course, a theory of argumentative discourse deals with speech acts, and a normative theory of argumentative discourse has to regiment such speech acts [E&G 1984, 4; 5 f.; Eemeren et al. 1996, 276 f.]. But this does not exclude that the rules for such speech acts refer to inner states such as an arguer's or addressee's opinion, intellectual capacities or - pace Van Eemeren and Grootendorst [E&G 1984, 4] - to abstract entities like propositions, which are the propositional content of such speech acts, and their inferential relations. And it is necessary to make such references in a consensus theory because its aim should be real consensus, which is the direct effect of reasoning procedures and only indirectly of speech acts. (And in a rational consensus theory, of course, the rules also have to refer to propositions and their inferential relations e.g. by requiring that some sequence of speech acts express a valid inference or true propositions.) In addition, in a sufficiently powerful consensus theory it is necessary to refer to opinions and propositions that have not been expressed because not everyone is able to express everything that influences his reasoning and because not all those who are able to, have the time to do so.

Let me extend the discussion by considering consensus theory in a more general form. The problem with normative consensus theories of argumentative discourse is not that they aim at consensus but that they take an unqualified consensus to be the aim of such discourse. Theories of argumentative discourse have also been proposed in epistemological argumentation theories, which see such discourses as enterprises for collectively seeking truth [Goldman 1999, 139-149; Lumer 1988]. Even in these theories the internal end of the game is to reach consensus. But it is a qualified, justified consensus, where both parties not only share the final opinion but - ideally - also their subjective justification for it. To take justified consensus as the aim of argumentative discourse avoids all the problems listed so far because justification - correctly conceived - is related to truth. It is based on cognizing procedures that guarantee the truth or at least the acceptability, i.e. truth, high probability or verisimilitude, of the results. What I would suggest to Pragma-Dialecticians then is to adopt justified consensus as the aim of argumentative discourse.
3. Elements of Epistemic Rationality in Pragma-Dialectical Discourse

Actually, Pragma-Dialectics is much nearer to the suggestion just intimated than it may at first appear, in particular as a consequence of its determination of the goal of argumentation and argumentative discourse. This is so due to a continuous incoherence in Pragma-Dialectics, namely the inclusion of important elements of epistemic rationality in its consensualistic programme. This incoherence is most evident in the Pragma-Dialectical rules for argumentative discourse.

Completely in line with the just criticized unqualified consensualistic determination of discourse's aim as dispute resolution, as their criterion for good discourse rules Van Eemeren and Grootendorst establish that such rules have to promote that aim. They write that the value of discourse rules or of a dialectical procedure is identical to the degree they help to resolve conflicts of opinion or that a dialectical procedure is valid to the degree it promotes the resolution of differences of opinion [E&G 1984, 151; 152; cf. 7-18, in particular 17; 2004, 16; 56; 56 f., note 35; 132; 134; Eemeren et al. 1996, 278; 279; cf. 311]. Strangely enough, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst never go on to prove that the rules they propose are the best in these terms. And actually these rules are not developed consequently along these lines but according to a vague idea of a rational discourse that includes many elements of epistemic rationality. So the structural determinations of argumentative discourse do not fit its assumed function. (This is not to say that the proposed rules cannot lead to (unqualified) consensus. Of course, they can. But they are not the best and complete kit for reaching this aim, whereas they are often more suited to another function. So they probably stem also from a different source, namely ideas of epistemic rationality.) As a consequence, Pragma-Dialectics is a hybrid theory, a mix of incompatible elements of unqualified consensualism and epistemic rationality.

Let us take a closer look at this inconsistency. As Goldman nicely caricatures, the most effective way to reach unqualified consensus may be to engage a professional mediator, whose secret strategy would consist in finding out which party is more prone to make concessions and then to canvass this party for pulling it in the opponent's direction [Goldman 1999, 159 f.]. Other means for reaching unqualified consensus include rhetorical and psychological tricks, eristic devices, a strategy of friendly offers
and giving up one's own opinion (this is particularly efficacious if only verbal consensus is what counts). None of these means will be the one that is best in all situations, however the best strategy for reaching unqualified consensus probably will include them all, each for particular situations.

Actually, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not include any of these means in their list and even explicitly oppose rhetoric [E&G 1992, 5]. This is due to their strong claims of rationality. However again it is typical of Pragma-Dialectics that these claims are ambiguous. On the one hand, there are purely verbal claims of rationality, which at a closer look turn out to be merely consensualistic or rhetorical. On the other hand there are many elements of real epistemic rationality in the Pragma-Dialectical theory in general and in its discourse rules in particular.

Some examples of merely verbal declarations for epistemic rationalism are the following. 1. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst declare: "Argumentation is [...] designed to justify [...] an expressed opinion and calculated [...] to convince a rational judge [...]" [E&G 1984, 18; the emphasis is mine, C.L.; similar: ibid. 9; 2004, 1; 10; 12 f.] But then they define this 'rational judge' simply in consensualistic terms as someone who follows such acceptable rules "which can lead to a resolution of the dispute" [E&G 1984, 18; cf. 5; 2004, 16; 17 f.; 132]. 2. As Siegel and Biro have already criticized [Siegel & Biro 1997, 280], Van Eemeren and Grootendorst reject rhetorical approaches by saying that their own aim is not the effective (in the usual sense) resolution of a dispute but its rational resolution [E&G 1992, 5; 6 f.; the doubts of a rational judge shall be overcome in a well-regulated critical discussion [ibid. 10 f.]. But then again the Pragma-Dialectical extra criterion for reasonableness is simply whether an argumentative procedure adequate for achieving the aim of dispute resolution is used [ibid. 6 f.]. 3. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst bind dispute resolution and the rules for it to "problem-validity" [E&G 2004, 17; 187]. But then the "problem" in question is equated with the difference(s) of opinion [E&G 2004, 16; 56 f., fn 35; 132; 134].

In addition to these seemingly epistemologically rational elements, which are then interpreted in consensualistic terms, there are declarations by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst for epistemic rationality that remain open to an epistemological or a consensualistic interpretation as long as the procedures mentioned are not specified. A
case in point is Van Eemeren's and Grootendorst's statement that discourses aim at an intellectually satisfactory exchange of views, at justifying one's opinion, so that the resulting views do not depend on prejudices, traditions or uncontrolled emotions. Ultimately, the resolution of the dispute should depend on the argumentation put forward. [E&G 1984, 2.] All this can be interpreted in an epistemological or in a consensualistic way.

On the other hand Pragma-Dialectics contains clear and strong epistemologically rational elements. A first such element is the prescription of a certain argumentative structure as the obligatory way to consensus, namely the use of argumentation, premises and inferences [Ro9-11/Rs7-9 (E&G 1984, 168-170; 2004, 147-151); more generally: E&G 1992, 34; 158 f.; 169; 184-194]. A second element is the strong use of logic and deductive arguments in the argumentation stage of discourse. A third rational element is the use of joint observation (originally as part of the intersubjective testing procedure [E&G 1984, 167]) and later as part of the intersubjective identification procedure [E&G 2004, 146 f.; cf. above, note 2]) and of probabilistic arguments again in the argumentation stage. But, unfortunately, again Van Eemeren and Grootendorst relativize even these clear elements of epistemic rationality in a consensualistic fashion. They see these elements as their personal proposals, which in order to be valid would then have to be jointly adopted by the respective discussants [E&G 1984, 163; 2004, 142]. (There is even some tension in the discussion rules: One part of the rules clearly prescribes much of argumentative structure [E&G, 1984, 168-170, Ro9-11; 2004, 147-151, Rs7-9], then however all this is subjected to the consensus rule, according to which premises, inference schemes etc. have to be agreed upon [E&G 1984, 163 f., Ro7; 2004, 143, Rs5].) Thus, Pragma-Dialectics' final determination of the aim of argumentative discourses amounts to unqualified consensus in a broader sense: the consensus about the claim in the end is subjected to rules, but now these rules depend only on an unqualified consensus (cf. note 4).
4. Some Philosophical Sources of Pragma-Dialectical Ideas of Epistemic Rationality

On the whole the writings of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst show a strong inclination towards standards of epistemological rationality, which then are corrupted by their adherence to unqualified consensualism. One reason why these two elements have not been brought together in a more satisfying way, specifically by taking justified consensus as the aim of rational discourse, may be the particular theories of epistemic rationality used by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, namely Critical Rationalism and the Erlangen Constructivism, especially Lorenzen's Dialogic Logic. Both these theories contain quite confused parts, which have been adopted by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst.

From Critical Rationalism they have taken in particular Albert's critique of justificationism by his "Münchhausen-Trilemma", which says that the attempt to justify every belief must lead to one of three bad alternatives, (1) an infinite regress, (2) a logical circle or (3) arbitrarily and dogmatically breaking off the justification [Albert 1980, 10-15; referred to by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst: E&G 1984, 16; 194, note 9; 1988, 279; 2004, 131]. The Münchhausen-Trilemma for Van Eemeren and Grootendorst is the reason, first, to give up the idea of positive justification and, second, to bet on negative criticism instead and thereby on dialectics, i.e. the inclusion of other persons, critics, as necessary elements in the process of epistemic rationality [E&G 1984, 16; 1988, 280; 2004, 131 f.]. This decision seems to have been their main reason for not seeking further positive forms of arguments beyond deductive ones and to stress the unforeseeable critical potential of an antagonist instead. And this, as will soon be shown, is one of the main weaknesses of Pragma-Dialectics. Now the Münchhausen-Trilemma is simply false.18 It rests on a hidden and false premise, namely that deduction from true premises is the only form of acceptable justification. This premise, together with the well-known properties of deductive justification, namely, first, to presuppose already justified premises and, second, to preserve at best, mostly to reduce but never to increase the informational content of the justified conclusion compared with that of the premises, leads to the exposed trilemma. But of course, there are forms of justification that do not rely on already justified premises, in particular observation;
and there are ampliative forms of justification (i.e. forms of justification that increase the thesis' informational content), in particular inductive reasoning. Thus there is no need to give up justificationism, on the contrary, and non-deductive forms of monological argumentation have to be studied and reconstructed in argumentation theory.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have adopted the Dialogic Logic as their own conception of logic from Lorenzen's and the Erlangen School's theories in general. They approve this logic for its dialogical, communicative and interactive character [E&G 1984, 12; 14; 193, n6; 2004, 50] as well as its enlargement by Barth & Krabbe [E&G 1984, 193, n6; 2004, 50 f.], they use this logic themselves [e.g. E&G 1984, 12-15] and they suggest it as the central tool in deductive argumentation [E&G 1984, 169; 2004, 148; Eemeren et al. 1996, 274]. There are four elements of the Erlangen School's programme and Dialogic Logic that are relevant in our context: (1) logical intuitionism, (2) anti-Platonism, (3) constructivism and (4) the dialogical conception of logic. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are interested in these elements in ascending order.

(1) **Logical intuitionism** is a weakening of classical logic, which - initially for certain applications in mathematical proofs - in particular does not accept the *tertium non datur* and, therefore, the equivalence of \( p \) and \( \neg \neg p \). This is the origin of the programme but nothing Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are particularly interested in.

(2) **Anti-Platonism** does not accept abstract entities like propositions and concepts; instead it speaks only of "sentence tokens" and "terms". For Van Eemeren and Grootendorst anti-Platonist ideas are one of the reasons for insisting on externalization, i.e. insisting on making everything explicit and concentrating on procedures instead of products and abstract schemes, which implies that one cannot conceive an argument as an abstract sequence of propositions or judgements [E&G 1984, 4] and that one cannot rely on premises and reasoning schemes that have not been explicitly accepted. Although anti-Platonism is feasible (Quine's materialism is a form of anti-Platonism too), it is a nasty ontology, which greatly complicates life in logic and epistemology. For instance one can no longer say: "This proposition has been proved by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*", and it is difficult to replace this sentence by a materialistic counterpart. And obviously because of these complications neither the members of the
Erlangen School, who speak of "schemes of sentences", which of course is another abstract entity, nor Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, who speak of "standpoints" and "propositional content" [E&G 2004, 135-137; 139; 142-148; 151; 154 etc.], have taken anti-Platonism completely seriously. In their latest publications they even speak of "propositions" [e.g. E&G 2004, 1; 145-147]. But then it is time to give up the consequences of anti-Platonism as well and to integrate in their theory a theory of arguments in the sense of sequences of propositions (or more precisely: statements in the sense of propositions plus the assertive mode).

(3) "Constructivism" means that all reasoning schemes and terms have to be explicitly introduced and that all reasoning steps like the introduction of premises and pieces of inferences have to be explicitly executed. The correct ideas behind constructivism are clarity and - in particular in mathematical contexts - avoidance of illusory "short-cuts" in reasoning. But constructivism is an exaggeration of these ideas, which, first, ignores that in discourses we can and must rely on a shared language and common knowledge. It would be absurd each time to try to "introduce" our complete vocabulary and common knowledge. The much more feasible and efficient way is knowledge exploitation, i.e. to rely on these common bases as far as one thinks they reach in the specific case, to make language usage explicit when one thinks that there could be ambiguities, to make premises explicit when they are used etc. Second, in its mania for explicit introducing and agreements, constructivism has a strong tendency towards a false form of conventionalism, namely to regard inference, reasoning and argumentation rules as something that is valid by convention and not as objective truths. If the meanings of logical operators and of terms are conventionally fixed, given the actual world, propositions' truth thereby is fixed as well. Whether certain inference schemes lead from true premises to true conclusions then is no longer a question of convention but of analytical truth; analogous considerations hold for uncertain ways of reasoning. And whether a given addressee already accepts particular premises and reasoning schemes is an empirical question. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have taken over many pieces of constructivism. In particular their rules to agree, in the opening stage, on all the premises and argument schemes that may be used in the further discourse [Ro7/Rs5, Ro9-10/Rs7-8 (E&G 1984, 163 f.; 168 f.; 2004, 143; 147-150)] is a constructivist heritage. Realistically enough they always loosen this requirement by
admitting tacit agreements on these matters [E&G 1984, 163; 166; 2004, 142 f.]. This goes very far in the direction of knowledge exploitation. It would be better still to give up constructivism completely and to replace it entirely with knowledge exploitation, which however has to be regimented quite differently. In addition, Pragma-Dialectics' requirement to agree on argument schemes goes in a conventionalist direction. This requirement is a blend of, on the one hand, a completely correct consideration of the fact that all addressees know or have understood only a limited set of argument schemes and, on the other hand, a false form of conventionalism, which makes the validity of an argument scheme falsely depend on the discussants' agreement. But of course, even if the antagonist does not agree to a particular argument scheme this by no means excludes its validity and the protagonist's being justified in believing his thesis on that basis.

(4) Dialogic Logic is a kind of logic that conceives logical proofs as dialogue games, where a proponent "defends" his thesis in an exactly regimented way against an opponent's "attacks" by logically decomposing it into elementary formulas already accepted by the opponent [cf. e.g. Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973, 209-231; Lorenzen & Schwemmer 1975, 56-147]. Dialogic Logic probably is the most confusing element of the Erlangen programme. Its sense can best be understood by comparing it to Beth's semantic tableaux [Beth 1955], i.e. a semantic way of proving an inference's logical validity. You take a sheet of paper and divide it into two columns by drawing a vertical line down the middle. The left column is reserved for the true propositions and the right column for the false propositions. The aim of the procedure is to systematically search for a consistent interpretation of the inference in question that shows it, the inference, to be invalid. This is an interpretation where the premises are true and the conclusion is false. If you do not find such an interpretation, the inference is valid. So at the top of the left column, i.e. the truths side, you write the premises, and at the top of the right, the falsities side, you write the conclusion. Premises and conclusions then have to be decomposed into elementary formulas, according to logical rules. If in the end the same elementary formula appears on the left as well as on the right side, this means that this formula has to be true and false at the same time. So it was impossible to construct a consistent falsifying interpretation of the inference (i.e. an interpretation where the premises are true but the conclusion is not). Therefore, the inference is valid. (In figure 1 this is illustrated with a simple example: the inference 'p, therefore: if q then p' ('p ⇒
"q→p") is scrutinized for its logical validity. For disproving its validity one has to find an interpretation where the premise p is true - therefore p appears in line 1 on the truths side - and the conclusion q→p is false - so q→p appears on the falsities side. For q→p to be false q must be true and p false; therefore the false q→p of line 1 in line 2 is decomposed into a true q and a false p. But now p appears on the falsities side (in line 2) as well as on the truths side (in line 1), which means that to make the inference invalid p must be true and false at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, the inference is valid.) This is a pencil-and-paper test that can be executed by one person; all the steps are exactly prescribed.

Figure 1: Semantic tableaux:

Is 'p ⇒ q→p' valid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>truths</th>
<th>falsities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>q→p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>q</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For falsifying the inference, p must be true and false at the same time, which is impossible. So the inference is valid.

Figure 2: Dialogue game:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>opponent / antagonist</th>
<th>proponent / protagonist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>q→p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>q ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now these semantic tableaux are structurally identical to the schemes of Dialogic Logic, first developed by Lorenzen in the late 1950s and elaborated by him and Lorenz in the 1960s and early 1970s [reprints: Lorenzen & Lorenz 1978]. Dialogic Logic, however, gives this structure a completely different interpretation. The basic idea of Lorenzen's Dialogic Logic is agonistic and constructivistic. He conceives logic in the spirit of the disputes that Greek philosophers had with the ancient Sophists, where two
parties try to refute each other and where logic is a means to find out if this is possible [Lorenzen 1960, 1]. And driven, among other factors, by an anti-Platonist horror of abstract entities like propositions and truth values [cf. ibid. 1; 7 f.], Lorenzen deprives the logical calculus as far as possible of semantic meanings and defines it in terms of operations to undertake or moves to play by a proponent and an opponent. In its complete form [first presented in: Lorenzen 1961] the resulting dialogue game even externally resembles Beth's tableaux. However the right side, the former falsities side, which contained the conclusion, is now assigned to a "proponent" and lists his statements, whereas the left, the former truths side, which contained the premises, is now assigned to the "opponent" and lists his statements; the former premises are mutated to the opponent's concessions (cf. figure 2). However, if there are no longer true and false propositions what do the players' statements mean? Lorenzen interprets them as follows. The prime-formulas $p, q$ etc. are simply undefined operations, e.g. to construct something or to demonstrate something by conducting an experiment [Lorenzen 1960, 2-4]. An implication $p \rightarrow q$ stated by the proponent is a kind of conditional promise to do $q$ in case the opponent produces $p$ [ibid. 4]. The proponent's stating a negation $\neg p$ is a challenge against which the opponent can win only by producing $p$ [ibid.] (or, explained a bit differently, it is an implication, i.e. a conditional promise, to do something impossible if the opponent produces $p$ [ibid. 5]). And so on. The rules of the dialogue game then say that the participants can challenge the other's statements, that the attacked participant in this case has to defend his statement in a prescribed way - which is analogous to the semantic decomposition of Beth's semantic tableaux - by producing more elementary statements, whereby the statements bit by bit are decomposed to elementary formulas. Finally, the proponent wins the game if, in the end, he can defend a challenged prime formula [Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973, 213].

A main problem with this Dialogic Logic is that the logical operators of common language simply do not have the dialogical, operational meaning assigned to them in Dialogic Logic. One person can (monologically) prove an implication $p \rightarrow q$ by proving that $p$ is false or by proving that $q$ is true - without having to wait for an opponent to prove $p$. One can recognize the truth of $p \rightarrow q$ by recognizing the falsity of $p$ or the truth of $q$ - without recurring to other persons' help. The analogue holds for a negation $\neg p$: we can prove and recognize the truth of the negation without challenging
another person who eventually tries to produce $p$. The logical operators of ordinary language have a truth functional meaning; and therefore complex propositions formed with their help in particular can be verified (or falsified) following the paths of truth functional relations expressed in them; no other person is involved in doing so. Logical operators can be used in communicative speech acts and for agonistic aims. However they are also used in our thinking and cognizing, in the propositions we (of course, individually) know or believe to be true; and if they (or better: the words expressing them) are used in communicative speech they serve to transmit such propositions, which then e.g. may be believed by the recipient. If the "logical operators" of Dialogic Logic hence have little to do with something similar to the logical operators of ordinary language and if logic is a theory about the relation between propositions on the basis of the (ordinary) logical operators included in them, then the games of Dialogic Logic either are no logic at all, or in order to be a logic they have to be reinterpreted as semantic tableaux (in Beth's sense), that is representing true and false propositions and the relation between them. The same argument holds for the interpretation of "winning the dialogue game". That the proponent has won the game is only an internal outcome of the game. If this is to have any external logical meaning the game has to be reinterpreted semantically: the proponent's victory is equivalent to the inference's logical validity in the usual terms (i.e. if the premises are true the conclusion must be necessarily true) - which, of course, is also the interpretation that Lorenzen wants to give to the proponent's victory [cf. Lorenzen 1961, 13]. But for the game's outcome to prove the logical validity, the whole "game" has to be reinterpreted as well, namely that what is on the left side are the false propositions etc., which is the complete semantic interpretation.

Of course, from a structural viewpoint, there is no obstacle to this reinterpretation because, as Lorenzen himself admits [Lorenzen 1961, 11; Lorenzen & Schwemmer 1975, 98], his own dialogue games and Beth's semantic tableaux are structurally identical. What really changes, though, by this reinterpretation are the following things: (1) Dialogic Logic can no longer be taken as a proof that logic is something dialogical. (2) The dialogical interpretation cannot contribute to the justification of logical rules (as Lorenzen hoped). (3) If the dialogical framing (like attributing the falsities side to a proponent) is maintained it is reduced to a - heavily
confusing - gewgaw but nothing serious. (4) And the "dialogic" rules and games cannot be taken as rules and formalizations of real argumentative discourses because the latter have completely different functions. Though some sequences of steps in semantic tableaux resemble sequences of turns in an argumentative dialogue, others do not, and above all, the moves in an argumentative discourse have a completely different function than the decomposition moves in semantic tableaux. In Dialogic Logic, e.g. \( \neg p \) may only be attacked by claiming \( p \), whereas in a real argumentative discourse, the "opponent" can also ask for a justification of \( \neg p \), and the "proponent" may provide this without any further participation of the "opponent"; or, to give another example, in real argumentative discourses the possible moves of attacking and defending should be symmetrical for both players, whereas in Dialogic Logic they are not - simply because in the "proponent's" case the falsity of the respective proposition has to be defended, whereas in the "opponent's" case its truth has to be defended.  

(5) In a real cooperative argumentative discourse the participation of other people has, among others, the functions of acquiring new knowledge or a fresh perspective on one's own position, and of eliminating myopia with respect to one's own errors. All these functions require the real participation of the other and hence a real dialogue. Dialogic Logic on the other hand, as being structurally identical to semantic tableaux, contains nothing really dialogical; one person can play both roles because all the steps to be executed are meticulously prescribed. And of course, logical reasoning can be executed internally by one person by proceeding from a belief in some premises, recognizing a logical implication, to believing in the conclusion.

Now Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have adopted Dialogic Logic as their favourite logic [E&G 1984, 169; 201, note 68; 2004, 148; Eemeren et al. 1996, 274], albeit with some criticisms and modifications [E&G 1984, 13-15]. This is harmless to a certain degree. But it is terribly misleading if Dialogic Logic is taken seriously and regarded as a proof of the necessary dialogic character of argumentation [E&G 1984, 12-14; 193, note 6]. Actually, argumentation (in the sense of "presenting an argument") is mostly a monologic activity, where someone argues for a certain thesis. And argument schemes have to be developed on this basis. A systematically second step then is to develop a theory of argumentations' integration into argumentative discourse. Fortunately, Pragma-Dialectics has not taken its theoretical profession of the necessary
dialogical character of argumentation too seriously. In the official definition [E&G 1984, 7; 18; 2004, 1], in the discussion rules [e.g. Ro8/Rs6, E&G 1984, 165; 2004, 144] and in analytic practice argumentation is always conceptualized monologically (in the sense explained in note 26) as the protagonist's advancing his thesis plus his defensive moves. Nonetheless, the theoretical assumption of the necessary dialogic character of argumentation may have been one of the reasons for Pragma-Dialectics' neglecting argumentation theory in the narrow sense, specifically for neglecting the study of non-deductive argument schemes: the details of such schemes are simply left to the discussants who have to reach an agreement about this [cf. below, sect. 6].

One of the lessons that could be learned from these strong criticisms of Pragma-Dialectics' epistemological foundations is that much could probably be improved by changing the epistemological basis of Pragma-Dialectics. Pragma-Dialectics is mainly a theory of argumentative discussion and not of (monological) argumentation. Combining it with the epistemological theory of argumentation and its epistemological foundations could already be the beginning of important progress.  

5. The Procedural Rules for a Critical Discussion

The constructive core of Pragma-Dialectics are the rules of conduct it proposes for critical discussions. In this section, the real discourse rules, i.e. the rules for integrating argumentation in discourses, will be discussed; the next section is dedicated to the rules for the argumentative core.

The Pragma-Dialectical discourse rules are designed for simple, i.e. single and nonmixed, discussion (originally called: "simple single discussion"), in which exactly one thesis (not even its negation) is discussed [E&G 1984, 152; 2004, 135; terminology: E&G 1992, 16-22]. This implies that the antagonist can accept the protagonist's thesis, or express non-acceptance or can ask for a justification, but he cannot advance an incompatible counter-thesis, specifically he cannot say that the protagonist's thesis is false. The same limitation holds for the antagonist's "attacks" on the single reasons and on the argumentative relation between reasons and thesis. This means real, offensive attacks are missing. And therefore the antagonist cannot point to the
protagonist's *errors*; no real *critique* is taking place. As a consequence the discussants cannot obtain certification of their respective theses by having them exposed to intersubjective critique. In addition, the antagonist cannot contribute his own knowledge to a cooperative search for truth. So the most important aims of a real discourse cannot be reached by Pragma-Dialectical "discourses". Pragma-Dialectical discourses are not really dialogical discussions. They are monological argumentations enlarged by possibilities to adapt this argumentation to the addressee's epistemic situation. Ironically enough, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst here have completely set aside the criticism of Critical Rationalism, which, of course, requires refutations by positive counter-evidence, and returned to justificationism. And still ironically, epistemological argumentation theories, which are often decried for their monological conception of argumentation, compared to Pragma-Dialectics are much more and only really dialogical when it comes to integrating argumentation in argumentative discourse [cf. Goldman 1999, 139-149; Lumer 1988]. One could think that Pragma-Dialectics' dealing with simple discussion only was just an initial restriction. However, after twenty years it is no longer appropriate to speak of an "initial" restriction. So some deeper problem may be lurking here. According to the Pragma-Dialectical terminological framework, including offensive criticisms by making counter-claims would come up to a "complex dispute" with several claims to be discussed. Now Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to think that such complex disputes are merely agglomerations of simple disputes; at least they write: "Complex disputes can be analyzed by breaking them down into a number of less complex disputes." [E&G 1992, 17.] But this would be an illusion because the "various" disputes refer to each other and have to be coordinated. First, many moves in a complex dispute regularly contain further, implicit moves; e.g. making a claim which is obviously incompatible with that of the other discussant but not being its negation implies claiming the negation too and implies demanding the opponent to provide a justification [cf. Lumer 1988, 458, R1]. Second, consistency requires reacting to various moves of the "crossing" sub-disputes with justifications, retractions, new claims etc. [cf. ibid. 460 f., R8]. Third, because such discussions easily get rather intricate and points get "lost" obligations to comment and structure the discourse are necessary [cf. ibid. 459-461, R6, R7, R9]. Developing good rules for solving these problems is by no means a trivial matter.
From the procedural standpoint Ro7/Rs5 (agreement about argumentation rules) [E&G 1984, 163 f.; 2004, 143] is the most irritating rule. It quite innocently requires that, in the preparation stage the discussants agree about the rules that shall govern and be binding for the entire discussion that follows. Only subsequent rules, in particular Ro9/Rs7 and Ro10/Rs8, reveal how many agreements are meant to be included: agreement about the intersubjective identification procedure (for identifying shared premises), the intersubjective testing procedure (which regiments observation [E&G 1984, 167] and the use of non-deductive argument schemes [E&G 2004, 149 f.], respectively), the intersubjective explicitization procedure (for making implicit premises explicit), the intersubjective reasoning procedure (i.e. the deductive logic) and the premises themselves as well [E&G 1984, 165 f.; 2004, 145]. In order to be fully consistent with this logic of agreements, rules Ro8/Rs6 to Ro17/Rs14 should have been included in that list. Of course, this list should have been made explicit in Ro7/Rs5.

These agreement requirements are a heritage of constructivism, which, in general, has already been criticized [section 4]. Some more specific problems are the following. First, the agreement requests are illusory, people cannot make all these things explicit and do not have the time to try to do so. Second, the agreement requirement is a simple fiat; nothing is said about how it could be reached. Considering that it includes encyclopedias, logics, epistemologies etc. it is not to be expected that discussants find an agreement. Third, an initial agreement is too rigid. The discussants may change their opinion about any one or more points. - Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to have seen some of these problems and therefore provide that the discussants commonly "assume tacitly that they accept more or less the same rules for the discussion" [E&G 1984, 163; similar: 2004, 142] and a common knowledge [E&G 1984, 166; 2004, 146]. But if this is so and if constructivism is illusory, they should give up the constructivist rule Ro7/Rs5 altogether and adopt the concept of knowledge exploitation. And since knowledge exploitation is not trivial this requires the introduction of new substantive rules on how to make assumptions about the other discussant's knowledge, what to do if such assumptions are false etc. But even if this is done a further big problem of the constructivist heritage remains. Leaving nearly everything to the discussants' agreement can be a lazy strategy because among the things it leaves open are the further discourse rules, logic, argumentation theory and epistemology. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
have elaborated theories in many of these fields as their proposals for such agreements, or they have suggested which other theories could be approved by the discussants - which already goes beyond unqualified consensualism. But still more has to be done, and because of its thick theoretical nature it cannot be left to a quick agreement of discussants: in particular the argumentation theory proper and rules for dealing with intersubjectively diverging knowledge. A theory that merely says these questions are up to the discussants' agreement simply has not done its homework. It is precisely the task of argumentation theorists to work out and explicitly discuss the respective theories and normative regulations, which then can be used in argumentative discourses.

Some minor procedural problems of the Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules are the following. 1. Surprisingly, Ro8/Rs6 [E&G 1984, 165; 2004, 144] allows only calling into question, i.e. not accepting, a proposition or the inferential link as (defensive) attack but does not permit asking for a justification only.\(^{33}\) 2. Ro11-12/Rs9 [E&G 1984, 170 f.; 2004, 151] provides that a protagonist has sufficiently conclusively defended a claim if he has successfully defended the propositional content and the justificatory potential of a respective argument (called into question by the antagonist). But this rule refers only to the case in which the antagonist attacks the argument that already has been provided by the protagonist; it does not provide anything for the case in which the antagonist already accepts the argument in the first step - which of course should count as a sufficient defence of the protagonist's claim. 3. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst always distinguish and deal separately with an argument's force of justification versus refutation of a standpoint [e.g. in Ro10-14/Rs8-11 (E&G 1984, 169-172; 2004, 150-152)]. But this is unnecessary. A refutation of (a definite) \(p\) is identical to a justification of \(\neg p\). (A refutation of \(p\) goes beyond a criticism of a justification for \(p\); such a successful criticism can only show that \(p\) has not been justified but not that \(p\) is false. A refutation of \(p\), however, shows \(p\) to be false, i.e. it shows \(\neg p\) to be true.) 4. The criticisms just advanced are internal; the next is an external criticism. The obligation to defend one's claim if an antagonist challenges it [Ro5/Rs3 (E&G 1984, 160; 2004, 139)] requires more cooperation than is rational because the prospects of a fruitful exchange could be too slim or even negative. There may be antagonists who would not understand the argument; the antagonist may be too closed-minded; the basis of shared opinions pertinent to the issue may be small so that the
discussion would have to be very extensive (this may happen in cases of great ignorance or deep disagreement [cf. Eemeren et al. 1993, 170-172]); the protagonist may have many challengers (and not the time); the protagonist may not expect too much for himself out of a discussion or may even expect hostile reactions etc.34

6. The Argumentation Rules for a Critical Discussion

The second part of my discussion of the Pragma-Dialectical discourse rules regards the rules for the argumentative core, its argumentation theory proper. Argumentation usually, even according to Pragma-Dialectics, is a monological activity: someone advances a thesis and presents reasons for it - even if the pertinent illocutionary acts are dispersed over several turns in a dialogue [cf. above, sect. 4]. Thus, argumentation is a smaller unit than an argumentative discourse, into which it can be integrated. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to accept all this. However, as a part of their meta-theoretical principle of "socialization" [E&G 1984, 9-15; 2004, 55 f.], they claim the necessary dialogical embeddedness of argumentation [Eemeren et al. 1996, 277; E&G 1992, 6 f.]. They write that argumentation is always part of a discourse where a protagonist and an antagonist (and perhaps more participants) try to resolve a difference of opinion; thus argumentation responds to - real or projected - questions, doubts, objections or counterclaims [ibid.]. However, this claim goes too far and thus may lead to confusing argumentation with argumentative discourse. First, in order to be convincing, an argumentation, of course, has to be adapted to the addressee's state of knowledge (about premises and inferences). But this adjustment is not necessarily dialogical; it only presupposes good assumptions about the addressee's knowledge. For example, when writing an argumentative book we cannot count on the dialogue but only on our knowledge about the addresses' knowledge. Second, to present reasons with the aim of convincing does not mean to react to questions, doubts, objections and counterclaims. If everything goes smoothly the addressee has already accepted the reasons and on this basis can also accept the claim, following the epistemic route pointed out in the argument - without questions, doubts, objections or counterclaims. This means the primary function of argumentation is epistemic and constructive, namely to guide the addressee during a process of recognizing the acceptability of the claim, it is
not agonistic; and according to this primary function, the arguer is not a protagonist, and
the addressee not an antagonist. A cooperative argumentative dialogue goes beyond this
by fulfilling at least two further functions. For one thing, dialogue can make the
adaptation to the addressee's knowledge more precise (he can e.g. say: 'I don't believe in
this premise, please justify it' or conversely: 'I know, there is no need to argue for this').
Furthermore, in a dialogical discourse the argument is exposed to criticism for letting
other people check whether or not it is flawed, for perhaps obtaining further information
about supporting or counter-evidences and thus for perhaps dropping, revising or
improving it in case of justified objections [cf. Lumer 1988, 452-454]. But again, even
in such a critically enlarged (cooperative) argumentative dialogue, the function of
objections is to make the other participant understand what is wrong with his position;
and the function of defences is to make the other understand the basis of the arguer's
position and thereby accept it; and of course, 'understanding' is an epistemic, not an
agonistic notion. - I am not saying that Pragma-Dialectics is very strongly opposed to
these ideas. However, the claim of a necessary dialogical embeddedness of
argumentation and the agonistic or defensive conception of arguments cause a tendency
to conflate argumentation and (dialogical) argumentative discourse and thus to eliminate
argumentation theory proper. Of course, we need both and Pragma-Dialectics needs
both too, an argumentation theory proper and a theory of argumentative discourse.35
Though Pragma-Dialectics says something about argumentation proper and proposes
pertinent rules, the just criticized ideas are probably some of the reasons why these parts
of Pragma-Dialectics are rather scanty. And with its tendency to reject argumentation
theory proper it undermines one of its necessary foundations.

In a perfect consensualistic fashion, Pragma-Dialectics conceives argumentation
rules as something that must be agreed upon by the discussants, i.e. as conventions
[E&G 1984, 163; 2004, 142]. And consequently, the Pragma-Dialectical argumentation
rules are advanced only as proposals for such conventions, without which they would
not have any validity [ibid.]. But what is the aim of such conventions? According to
Pragma-Dialectics, it is to resolve differences of opinion. However, the question can be
repeated, why should people try to do so? In particular if one speaks of expressed
opinions only, one could introduce such conventions like rules of an entertaining game
like chess, where one finally arrives at an explicit but meaningless "consensus", which
has nothing to do with one's opinions. Of course, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not want this. Why should we want a real consensus? Convincing someone of a particular thesis in a rhetorical vein may have strategic advantages, but why should the arguer want to share this opinion? Pragma-Dialectics is silent about these questions; it simply does not contain a theory about the function of argumentation and about the way in which this function can be fulfilled by argumentation. And without such a function-analysis argumentation rules will be arbitrary or only accidentally useful.

The straightforward answers to these questions are epistemological; and the usually recognized argumentation rules can best be explained epistemologically. The function of argumentation is to provide justified belief, which is systematically (though not strictly) connected to truth [Lumer 2005a, sect. 4; 2005b, sect. 1]; and shared justified belief is a greater guarantee that this belief is really true. Argumentations help to achieve justified belief by guiding an addressee's cognizing the thesis etc. [Lumer 2005a, sect. 5; 1990, 45-48; 280-281; 1991, 102-104]. If one adopts this epistemological function-analysis of argumentation, argumentation rules cannot simply be conventions. As Siegel, Biro and Goldman have already criticized, agreeing on fallacious argumentation rules like the gambler's fallacy or plainly absurd or arbitrary argumentation rules like admitting only arguments with an even number of premises, simply does not lead to true or at least acceptable belief [Biro & Siegel 1992, 91; Goldman 1999, 159]. Argumentation rules have to fulfil two essential functions: first, following them should guarantee the thesis' truth or acceptability, i.e. truth, high probability or verisimilitude, and second, following them should provide epistemic accessibility of the truth (or acceptability) to the addressee, for example by requiring that the premises be known to the addressee. Whether a particular set of argumentation rules fulfils these functions does not depend on convention but is an objective fact - much like the functioning of a machine -; it depends e.g. on how these rules refer to theses' truth conditions. Someone can find out these rules, follow them for the first time in trying to convince a particular addressee who does not know anything about these rules, and they could still fulfil their function. Think for example of rules for logical deduction. Whether such rules always lead from true premises to true conclusions depends on the definitions of truth functional operators, which determine the truth-value of complex propositions dependent on the truth-value of elementary propositions; given
such definitions, the consistency and functionality of logical rules is not a question of agreement. Independence of agreement makes monological argumentation possible and, of course, facilitates discourses; the bulk of the Pragma-Dialectical opening stage becomes superfluous.

What just has been said about argumentation rules analogously holds for premises or, more generally, for reasons too. Pragma-Dialectics is completely consensualistic here in prescribing only shared acceptance of premises [Ro9/Rs7 (E&G 1984, 168; 2004, 147) and E&G 1984, 165 f.; 2004, 145]. But, of course, such consensus does not imply the premises' truth or acceptability. An epistemologically correct rule for premises has to fulfil the requirements of acceptability and accessibility. These will be fulfilled by requiring justified belief in the premises, whereas the Pragma-Dialectic requirement of shared acceptance guarantees only accessibility. Ro11/Rs9 [E&G 1984, 170; 2004, 151] determines that the protagonist has successfully / conclusively defended a thesis if he has successfully defended the reasons for this thesis as well as their argumentative relation to the thesis against the antagonist's attacks. Now the antagonist may have accepted too much of the protagonist's moves because they share false beliefs. This may also happen in a discourse regimented by epistemologically designed discussion rules. But because of their relation to truth conditions such a consensus can be externally criticized as false or as not correctly justified, whereas Pragma-Dialectics, as a consequence of its consensualism has no means for criticizing the achieved consensus.

Originally, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst proposed only one type of argumentation, namely deductive argumentation [cf. Ro10/Rs8 (E&G 1984, 169; 2004, 150)] - which has been criticized e.g. by Pinto [Pinto 2001, 133]. And they recommended - and still do so - Lorenzen's Dialogic Logic, as the logic to be used here [E&G 1984, 169; 201, note 68; 2004, 148; Eemeren et al. 1996, 274]. This is surprising because, aside from its dialogic varnish this logic is intuitionistic and thus rather heterodox, so that a justification of this choice would have been in order; however, there is none.

More recently, however, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also included some further argument schemes [E&G 1992, 94-102; 2004, 149 f.; 150, Rs8], namely: (1)
symptomatic or concomitance argumentation of the form 'a is F; Fs are typically / by nature / in fact G; therefore a is G'; (2) comparison argumentation or argumentation by analogy of the form 'a and b are similar / analogous / comparable; a is F; therefore b is F'; and (3) instrumental or causal argumentation with the forms (3.1) 'p is F; type F events (usually) cause type G events; therefore there will be a type G event' or (3.2) 'p is G; type F events (usually) cause type G events; therefore there was a type F event' or (3.3) 'p is G; type G events (usually) are caused by type F events; therefore there was a type F event' or, finally, (3.4) 'action a is F; type F events (usually) cause type G events; therefore as a consequence of doing a there will be an event q of type G; and because q is good a should be done' [E&G 1992, 96-99; Eemeren et al. 1996, 301 f.; Garssen 1995, 230 f.]. The function of the theory of argument schemes in Pragma-Dialectics and their relation to logical forms of arguments is not totally clear. A part of the (sub-)schemes is deductively valid and thus already (implicitly) included in the original theory; another part is not - in particular there are probabilistic, abductive and practical arguments trying to establish the goodness of an option -; and thus the spectrum of arguments taken to be valid is extended. In any case, the Pragma-Dialectical argument schemes are intended to be principles that legitimize the step from the premises to the thesis, that guarantee the transfer of the premises' acceptability onto the thesis and thus have to be used to assess the validity of arguments [E&G 1992, 96; Garssen 1999, 225].

The idea behind this normative use of the Pragma-Dialectical argument schemes is that the transfer of acceptability goes via the material relation between the state of affairs expressed in the (minor) premise and the state of affairs expressed in the claim. So if someone accepts that there is an event e of type F, and type F events cause type G events, then he should accept that there is a type G event. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish three such types of relations, which lead to the three argument schemes: the relation of concomitance is the basis of symptomatic arguments; the relation of similarity or analogy is the basis of arguments by analogy; and the causal relation is the basis of causal or instrumental arguments [E&G 1992, 96 f.]. The specific relation can be described and made explicit in the major premise (cf. the schemes described above). The fact that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst take such material relations between the states of affairs described in the (minor) premise and in the claim, respectively, to be the basis of the argument's validity - and not the logical, analytical or
rational relation among the respective propositions - goes strongly in the direction of a theory of material inference rules, where the inference rules are expressed by the argument schemes and justified by the material relation. (This interpretation would at least make sense of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argument schemes as a way to explain and justify non-deductive arguments.)

This theory of argument schemes is problematic in several respects. To begin with the last point, material relations between (worldly) states of affairs cannot justify inference rules. They might "justify" the proposition of the major premise, which describes the material relation. But this is only the major premise and not an inference rule, which says that if premises so and so (e.g. the major and the minor premise) are acceptable, then the conclusion is also acceptable. Theories establishing and justifying the latter kind of relation instead are logic, probability theory etc. and epistemology in general. Material relations are not on the right ontic level to be able to justify inference and argumentation schemes. Logic, probability theory etc. on the other hand can capture those material relations if they are described in complex propositions of the above mentioned forms. All this implies that the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argument schemes is lacking a rational foundation of its validity criteria. Some further problems are the following. Pragma-Dialectical argument schemes have the forms described above. Symptomatic arguments then are, best understood, a particular type of deductive arguments (with a sure singular and a sure general premise) or probabilistic arguments (with a sure singular and a statistical premise). Analogies are good heuristic devices but, because of the unclear extension of the analogy, bad arguments. Instrumental arguments, finally, as they are conceived in Pragma-Dialectics are a very heterogeneous group held together only by the occurrence of a premise describing a causal relation. They include deductive or probabilistic arguments with a general or statistical premise (‘type \( F \) events (mostly) cause some type \( g \) event’), which are well-known and unproblematic. They include abductive arguments (‘\( p \) is \( G \); type \( F \) events (usually) cause type \( G \) events; therefore there was a type \( F \) event’), which - without a complementary premise about the frequency of the cause in question (‘events of type \( F \) are the most frequent cause of type \( G \) events’) - are bad arguments. And they include the most simple practical arguments (about one advantage or disadvantage of a certain course of action), which are well-known and valid argument schemes but where the causal question is a
subordinate point in a complex value comparison. Even if we exclude the problematic
argument types there still remain some non-deductive argument types. However, these
additional argument types are too particular, and the resulting list of argument types is
very unsystematic. But the major problem is that many argument types are still missing:
all the probabilistic and statistical arguments other than the one with a singular and
statistical premise, theoretical arguments for empirical theories and theoretical theses,
more complex practical arguments for value judgments etc. [cf. Lumer 2005b, sect. 3].
These problems at least in part are due to the lack of a function-analysis of
argumentation in Pragma-Dialectics.

Let me sum up some major results of this discussion of Pragma-Dialectics. (1) Its
two main aims make Pragma-Dialectics a heterogeneous theory composed of
unqualified and therefore unsatisfactory consensualism and an ill-conceived form of
epistemic rationalism. A better synthesis of the useful parts of these ideas would be to
take justified consensus as the aim of argumentative discourse. (2) Pragma-Dialectics
relies on very problematic epistemologies, namely Critical Rationalism and Dialogic
Logic. Pragma-Dialecticians should look for a better partner in this field. (3) The
procedural rules for a critical discussion are a strong point of Pragma-Dialectics. But
they should be expanded to rules for a complete discourse and be corrected in several
details with an eye on the function of argumentative discourse, i.e. to cooperatively
search for truth and to certify justified beliefs by exposing them to intersubjective
criticism. (4) The rules for argumentation proper are a weak point of Pragma-Dialectics.
This is due to the unqualified consensualism and to the lack of a function-analysis of
argumentation. Epistemological argumentation theories have much more to offer in this
respect. Thus they could provide the necessary complement to the procedural rules,
which are the strong point of Pragma-Dialectics.

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Notes
Apart from tiny linguistic improvements, the 2003 and the 2004 formulations are identical.

In addition to this improvement, according to a literal interpretation, it seems as if the originally included possibility of common observation has now, surprisingly enough, been deleted. According to a reading that is better informed about the authors' intention (and was imparted to me by one of the referees), however, the possibility of common observation shall now be included in the intersubjective identification procedure and thus regimented by Rs7. (This reading is not obvious from what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst write: Rs7 speaks of the "intersubjective identification procedure", which on page 146 of *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation* [E&G 2004] is defined as referring to the methods for determining whether a certain proposition appertains to the list of the (previously) accepted propositions; this implies that common observation of events described in new claims is not included here; and this is in line with the original definition of the 'intersubjective identification procedure' [E&G 1984, 166]. On page 147, however, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst speak of common observation. And according to the better informed reading, this passage shall still explain the content of the intersubjective identification procedure, thus extending it beyond what has been defined before. So, according to the better informed reading, the "intersubjective identification procedure" then would have been considerably redefined with respect to the original version [E&G 1984, 166] and even with respect to the more recent literal definition [i.e. E&G 2004, 146].)

One such technical change is the cancellation of explicitization as a means of proving a thesis [Ro10/Rs8: E&G 1984, 169; 2004, 150]. "Explicitization" originally meant making implicit premises explicit so that a deductively valid argument results [E&G 1984, 141; 149]. Therefore explicitization already implied the argument's logical validity. Now these things have been split up into two steps (first explicitization, then deduction) [E&G 2004, 150, Rs8], so that in principle explicitization could also be used to make non-deductive arguments completely explicit. However, for this purpose the theory of explicitization has to be updated to cover non-deductive argument schemes as well. And this has not yet been done [cf. ibid. 117 f.; 121]. - A detailed comparison of the old and the new rules now can be found in: Zenker 2007.

As we will see in the following section, in a systematically later stage Pragma-Dialectics goes beyond this initially fixed aim and requires that the dispute resolution be reached by a regimented discussion. But even the consensus resulting from these discussions is still *unqualified in a broader sense*, namely in the sense that now the discussion and argumentation rules governing the discussion as well as the premises to be used are established by an unqualified consensus which is not subject to further conditions - e.g. epistemic principles [cf. E&G 1984, 163-168, in particular Ro7; 2004, 143, Rs5].

Pragma-Dialectics even takes "convincing" (a "rational judge" or "reasonable critic") to be the defining aim of argumentation [E&G 1984, 2; 3; 4; 9; 18; 29; 2004, 1; Eemeren et al. 1996, 279], which usually is considered as the definitions of a rhetorical approach to argumentation. So,
Later Van Eemeren and Grootendorst set out their epistemological position, i.e. a particular version of Critical Rationalism, rather extensively [E&G 1988; restated in a slightly condensed version in: E&G 2004, 123-134]. However, 1. in this exposition Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not provide a positive justification of Critical Rationalism (or of their version of it), 2. neither does this position lead to the consensualistic conception of critical discussions as aiming at an agreement. **Ad 1:** After a (negative) critique of classical rationalism (or in Van Eemeren's and Grootendorst's terms - taken from Toulmin - of the "geometrical view") as being dogmatic and a critique of the rhetorical argumentation theory ("anthropological view") as being relativistic, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst rather ad hoc introduce their own proposal, i.e. critical dialectical testing [E&G 1988, 279 f.; 2004, 131]. But they never say, what this critical testing is good for in the first place, and specifically, how it relates to truth. They repeat instead that the reasonableness of the dialectical procedure lies in its potential to resolve differences of opinion [E&G 2004, 132]. If this shall amount to a justification of the goal, i.e. resolving differences of opinion, it would obviously beg the question. **Ad 2:** In that exposition Van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose a falsificationist position (opponents try to criticize the proponent's thesis), which has little to do with the positive aim of dispute resolution, i.e. agreeing about the opinion in question. The falsificationist position is at odds with the positive justificatory core of the Pragmatic-Dialectical discussion, which is regimented by the discussion rules on justification - beginning with the obligation to defend one's claim when asked to do so and ending with the criteria for when the protagonist has conclusively defended his initial standpoint (cf. Ro4-5/Rs2-3 [E&G 1984, 158-161; 2004, 137-140] and Ro8-12/Rs6-9 [E&G 1984, 164-171; 2004, 143-151]). Completely in line with the falsificationist position, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in that exposition interpret the aim of a critical discussion negatively: the aim is not to maximize agreement but to minimize disagreement [E&G 1988, 286]. That this cannot be the real aim of an argumentative discussion in the usual sense, however, can be seen from the fact that the aim of minimizing disagreement can even be achieved by not believing or not claiming anything. -

Habermas, too, has developed a consensus theory of argumentation, which, however, claims a strong connection between consensus and truth, namely that an (ideal) consensus about \( p \) is the criterion of \( p \)'s truth [Habermas 1973]. However, this very tight connection between consensus and truth is acquired by paying a high price: Habermas' truth is void in that it lacks correspondence features; it simply does not say anything about how the world is. (More detailed criticism: Lumer 1990, 291-296.)

In rare cases coordination works although both players have false beliefs. Think e.g. of an appointment to meet at 8:00 p.m. at the "Il Mangia" restaurant, where both parties mistake the same restaurant to be the "Il Mangia" and meet at the same restaurant at 8:00 p.m. But these are
rare and lucky chances. And it is nothing that could be deliberately achieved. In any case, this is not the aim of rational discourse. Strangely enough, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in *Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies* go on to spell out the responsibility (and the preparatory) condition in terms of beliefs [E&G 1992, 33].

The Pragma-Dialectic rules of discourse do not even include a sincerity condition, which requires that the participants believe what they assert [E&G 1984, 201, note 67]. But Van Eemeren and Grootendorst assume that the discussants are serious, i.e. saying what they mean [E&G 1984, 151 f.].

Apart from externalization, some further reasons for this disastrous rule are that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not sufficiently consider intersubjective differences in knowledge and that they discuss only simple, i.e. single nonmixed, discourses [cf. below, section 5], which do not allow the antagonist to advance theses himself, so that the protagonist could attack them.

In the most recent exposition of their theory, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst implicitly accept the latter point by defining 'argumentation' as an activity of "putting forward ... propositions" [E&G 2004, 1].

Goldman's and Lumer's theories deal with argumentative dialogues that start with one speaker making a claim and advancing an argument for it, which then is scrutinized by the other speaker, perhaps corrected etc. until a justified consensus is finally reached. (Lumer calls this type of argumentative dialogue "disputation"). This by no means excludes that there are also other types of argumentative dialogues which also aim at a justified consensus, e.g. *inquiry* dialogues where the participants scrutinize a perhaps promising but not yet accepted hypothesis by searching for possible reasons in its favour, possibly modifying it etc. [cf. Blair 2007]. However, the first form seems to occur much more frequently.

Going through what Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (or other contributors) write about the "epistem(olog)ic(al) approach" [cf. the pages listed in the subject index: Eemeren et al. 1996, 412] reveals that a clear idea of this approach as an approach aiming at knowledge or justified belief is missing there. Thus Pragma-Dialecticians so far simply might not have examined this possibility to improve their approach.

Siegel & Biro have nicely documented these verbal forms of epistemic rationality in Pragma-Dialectics: Pragma-Dialectics aims at epistemic rationality, which then is defined in consensualistic terms [Siegel & Biro 1997 282 f.]. They explain this ambivalence this way: Pragma-Dialectics wants to have both, fulfilment of epistemic rationality criteria and the binding to resolution of conflicts of opinion. However, one cannot have it both ways [ibid. 284]. There are sound argumentative turns in a discourse that are counter-productive for resolving the difference of opinion and, therefore according to Pragma-Dialectics should be fallacies; and the opposite holds as well [ibid. 284]. (Siegel & Biro take up a criticism of: Blair & Johnson 1993,
This important point should be examined a bit more in depth. Justified belief and consensus are both valuable but only partly overlapping aims. One can and should try to combine them by looking for justified consensus. This makes sense from an epistemological point of view if it is the internal goal of discourses that externally aim at cooperatively searching for truth and at providing more rational certitude about one's beliefs by exposing them to other people's criticisms [Lumer 1988, 448-450]. This usually works quite well. But even with justified consensus as the aim of argumentative discourse, in unfortunate cases of strongly diverging knowledge bases there can remain tensions between justification and consensus in the way that one speaker is justified in believing a certain proposition, whereas the other is not; the other could even justifiedly believe in an incompatible proposition. However, in such cases one result of the discourse would be that both speakers agree that the second speaker cannot check the truth of some of the first speaker's premises.

With respect to common observation, in *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion* [E&G 1984, 167] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst refer only to Kamlah's and Lorenzen's book [Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973, 117-128], where the steps of the observation are described. Later they also mention consulting oral or written sources like encyclopedias, dictionaries and reference works [cf. E&G 2004, 147].

At least some of the arguments that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst classify as 'symptomatic arguments' can best be interpreted as probabilistic arguments with a statistical major premise of the form 'most Fs are G' - cf. e.g. their example of the major premise "Americans are inclined to care a lot about money" [E&G 1992, 96; referred to: 2004, 150, note 20].

For a detailed criticism of Albert's Münchhausen-Trilemma see: Lumer 1990, 197-209.

An obvious solution to this problem seems to be to abridge the agreement by referring to standard reference works: 'In this discourse are in force the "Oxford English Dictionary", the "Encyclopaedia Britannica", the Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules and the "Logische Propädeutik" of Kamlah and Lorenzen.' But this solution is illusory because, first, nobody knows the complete content of these works - and there are great interpersonal differences in what is known -, second, because even these works contain mistakes or people disagree about too many single points and, third, because the discussants may share a lot of situational and local knowledge that is not contained in such works. People's knowledge is too individualistic.

Beth had published his semantic tableaux method already in 1955. Lorenzen presented his (more or less) complete calculus of Dialogic Logic to the public during a conference in 1959 (Warsaw, 2-9 September 1959) [printed as: Lorenzen 1961], where he already referred to Beth's tableaux [ibid. 11]. Nonetheless, Lorenzen seems to have invented his calculus in parallel to Beth. During a conference already in 1958 (Venice, 12-18 September 1958) [printed as: Lorenzen 1960] he presented the essential ideas of his calculus (dialogue game, dialogical definition of the logical operators etc.) - whereas the characteristic technical elaboration (table divided into two halves
with subdivisions, rows one under the other for the consecutive moves etc.) is still missing. Beth is not mentioned in this earlier paper; the approach to the problem is quite different from Beth's; so it is not unlikely that Lorenzen did not yet know Beth's semantic tableaux, though Lorenzen had just reinvented its structural essentials. In a letter to Beth (Beth archive 8/17 1959) Lorenzen then states that he was struck by the similarity between Beth's tableaux and his own calculus. Beth's reply is open and friendly. - Many thanks to an anonymous referee, who provided the latter details from the Beth archive and proposed the hypothesis of an independent invention!

A parallel exposition of the logical operators' dialogical meaning is e.g.: Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973, 157-164.

Lorenzen's references to Beth's semantical tableaux are rather scarce. In his most popular book, "Logische Propädeutik" [Kamlah & Lorenzen 1973] he does not even mention Beth or semantic tableaux. Lorenzen seems to have been convinced that the Dialogic Logic stands on its own and that it needs no semantic interpretation.

Some further examples of Dialogic Logic's rules that make no sense in argumentative discourse are given in: Lumer 1988, 446. - In the heyday of the Erlangen School, i.e. the 1970s and the 1980s, Lorenzen and his followers justified the (intuitionistic) logical rules as rules that were simply a consequence of "the" general rules of argumentative dialogue. As a student this puzzled me a lot because I found many of these "dialogue rules" questionable or even plainly absurd - until I finally found the solution: the dialogue rules had nothing to do with rules of an argumentative discourse, they simply were the rules of Bethian semantic tableaux for proving logical inferences. Lorenzen and his followers, however, were not bent on revealing this connection, perhaps because doing so would have threatened their constructivistic interpretation and the alleged dialogical justification of (intuitionistic) logic as a consequence of general dialogue rules.

A more extensive criticism of Dialogic Logic along these lines is given in: Lumer 1990, 317 f. In particular, some members of the Erlangen School who later dissociated themselves from the dialogic conception of logic are quoted.

These criticisms nicely demonstrate that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst too have been taken in by the Erlangen School's (and probably also Barth's and Krabbe's [Barth & Krabbe 1982]) interpretations of semantic logical proofs as argumentative dialogues [cf. above, note 23]. Being irritated by some of its "strange" regulations, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose revisions, which liken these games more to the usual argumentative dialogues - thus ignoring the real function of these games, namely to be systems of semantical logical proofs.

Please note that "monologic" is meant here only in the weak sense, i.e. that one and the same person presents the whole (perhaps complex) argument. It is not meant in the strong sense that only one person is speaking during the conversation. The intended weak sense of "monologic" does not exclude that the arguer's presentation of his argument be distributed over several turns
in a dialogue and interrupted by the questions or objections of another speaker. However, usually such questions and objections mainly have the function of fitting the argument to the addressee; but it remains the arguer's argument. - In much rarer cases two or more persons together, in a kind of inquiry, try to construct an argument. In such cases the argument can be formulated dialogically: one piece of the argument is uttered by speaker 1, another piece is added by speaker 2 [Blair 2007]. Whether monologic or dialogic presentation of arguments is more frequent is an empirical question. What is not empirical though, is that arguments are sequences of judgements or statements (i.e. propositions with an assertive mode); and as such they are clearly apt to be presented monologically. The deeper reason for this is that arguments present essential steps of a reasoning process; and because reasoning is an individual activity the steps represented in an argument must be such that they can be executed individually and their results can be uttered monologically.

27 Biro and Siegel [2006, 10] essentially make the same suggestion.

28 In complex disputes the antagonist can advance an incompatible counter-thesis as well as counter-claims against single reasons etc. However, the Pragma-Dialectical discourse rules are designed for simple discussions only and therefore do not allow such moves. The seemingly obvious solution, i.e. to conceive mixed disputes as additions of simple discussions and then to apply the discourse rules also to them, is discussed below - with a negative result.

29 The Pragma-Dialecticial rules for argumentative discourse and the Pragma-Dialectical theory in general clearly deal also with complex arguments, where one thesis is defended with several independent reasons or where at least one reason is justified by a subordinated argument [cf. Ro12/Rs9, E&G 1984, 171; 2004; 151; Snoeck Henkemans 1992; 2003]. But in such cases the complex argument remains an extended argument of the protagonist; the antagonist still does not get the right to attack offensively and to make his own claims. - The Pragma-Dialectician Snoeck Henkemans also deals extensively with a protagonist's replies to an antagonist's criticisms, and some of the antagonist's moves she mentions, namely rejecting an argument as unacceptable, insufficient or irrelevant [Snoeck Henkemans 1992, 92; 2003, 410], go beyond what is permitted according to the Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules. In addition, she deals with mixed disputes, where, apart from the protagonist's thesis, an opposing standpoint is also discussed [id. 1992, 131-134]. Curiously, however, she discusses all this from the perspective of the protagonist who replies to possible objections in his monological but complex argumentation [id. 1992, 85; 134-153; 2003, 407; 411-418]. And the example for an allegedly mixed dispute turns out to be only a coordinate argumentation (with several, and each of them necessary, reasons) of the protagonist [id. 1992, 133 f.]. All this means that the crucial question of extending the antagonist's possibilities is always carefully evaded.

30 In my own model of argumentative dialogues groups of possible moves are distinguished: A-moves, which allow argumentation, B-moves, which include agreements and requests of
justification by the opponent, C-moves, which allow the opponent's attacks, etc. [Lumer 1988, 450-457]. Pragma-Dialectical discourses correspond to what I have called "simple argumentative dialogue", which consists of A- and B-moves only [Lumer 1988, 454]; in particular equivalents to the C-moves are missing.

Surprisingly, the agreement requirement Ro7/Rs5 is introduced among the "Rules for the argumentation stage" [E&G 1984, 162 f.; cf. 2004, 142], even though the agreement clearly belongs to the opening stage.

Strangely enough, from 1984 to 2004 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have kept the name for this procedure ("intersubjective testing procedure") but completely changed its content. The regimentation of non-deductive argument schemes should have a different title!

In Pragma-Dialectics "calling into question" means doing two things, (i) not accepting, uttering doubts, and (ii) asking for a justification. In ordinary discourse practice, however, we can do the latter (ii) without doing the former (i). The significant pragmatic difference is that by uttering doubts one takes a (weak) position (at least 'I do not believe that \( p \)', or a bit stronger: 'I have initial evidences that \( p \) may not be true'), which now on its own can be questioned and thus creates justificatory obligations, whereas simply asking for a justification does not. (Because of this pragmatic difference in my own reconstruction of argumentative dialogues the two types of moves belong to different groups. Asking for a justification only helps to adjust the proponent's argument (to the addressee's epistemic situation), whereas utterance of doubts is a weak form of attack. [Lumer 1988, 453; 455 - moves B2 and C4.])

Another procedural problem of the Pragma-Dialectical rules has been discussed above [section 2], namely that rule Ro17/Rs14 obliges the protagonist to retract his thesis if he cannot sufficiently defend it against the antagonist's attacks, i.e. justification requests [E&G 1984, 174; 2004, 154].

In addition, Pragma-Dialecticians criticize that arguments are "typically" seen as externalizations of individual thought processes [Eemeren et al. 1996, 277]. This criticism, too, makes for unnecessary opposition. Arguments are sequences of statements or judgements (i.e. propositions plus the assertive mode) plus an indicator of argumentation. Such arguments can be used internally for cognizing a hypothesis, and they can be used communicatively, for justifying one's position or for convincing an addressee [Lumer 2005a, sect. 4].

Bart Garssen has improved and expanded Van Eemeren's and Grootendorst's theory of argument schemes [e.g. Garssen 1995; 1997; 1999; 2002]. However, he does not further extend the list of argument schemes but bases his research on Van Eemeren's and Grootendorst's list. And the major part of his contribution regards empirical questions - like whether ordinary speakers can differentiate the Pragma-Dialectical argument schemes -, which do not contribute to the justification of these argument schemes.
References


